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 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Justification and objectives of the study: 
 
Despite a high potential, cotton production remains low in Ghana. Most of the cotton 
sector key players are facing serious difficulties and Government of Ghana has 
requested the support of AFD for developing the sector. To assess such an 
opportunity, AFD and MOFA have agreed that a diagnostic study should be 
conducted, in order to have a clear picture of the situation, the opportunities and 
constraints and to provide some recommendations on the preliminary conditions 
necessary to revamp the industry. The Consulting firm SOFRECO has been selected 
for that purpose. 
 
Outputs expected from the study (TOR):  
 
“The study will include a review of the operations of the major cotton companies and 
key stakeholders, a general overview of the international cotton market, a review of 
the technical, financial, legal, institutional, economic and social aspects of the 
production, as well as some perspectives and recommendations for the future of this 
sector”. 
 
Mission work programme: 
 
The study has been undertaken by a team of international and Ghanaian experts1, 
who began their assignment on August 7th, 2006.  
The summary itinerary of the mission is shown in the table below: 
Date Itinerary 
 Meetings in ACCRA 
7th August Meetings at MOFA, AFD, MOTI  
8th  Meetings at ADB, NULUX, PDL 
9th  Meetings at French Embassy, Chemico (Tema) 
10th  Trip to TAMALE 
11th  Honourable Regional Minister NR, RADU, Cotton Standing Committee 
12th  Visit GCCL in Bolgatanga; visit to cotton farmers in two villages 
13th  Visit to cotton farmers 
14th  Meeting with Cotton Companies; meeting with Regional Director RADU 
15th  Visit to Cotton Companies 
16th  Meeting with Cotton Farmer’s Association; visit to cotton farmers 
17th  Visit to cotton farmers 
18th  Meeting at Bonzali Rural Bank; Debriefing meeting with Regional Director RADU; meeting at SARI 
19th  Meeting with Pr Deetoh, UDS 
20th  Trip TAMALE – WA (UW Region) 
21st  Meeting with Regional Director and staff RADU; meeting at PDL; visit to cotton farmers  
22nd  Trip TAMALE - ACCRA 
23rd  Meetings at NULUX (Reinhart), GCCL, World Bank 
24th  Meetings at WIENCO, AFD, OLAM 
25th  Meeting at Akosombo Textiles Ldt 
 
                                                
1  The mission has been driven by Mr Solomon Ansah, Schedule Officer for Cotton MOFA / Crop 
Services; the SOFRECO Team members were: Lucien Rossignol (Team Coordinator), Mr Hervé 
Guibert (Agronomist – CIRAD), Mrs Alice Owiaba (Sociologist), Mr Ben Adamafio (Financial expert). 
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2 SITUATION OF THE COTTON WORLD MARKET 
 
 
2.1 World market of cotton (past evolution and recent trend) 
 
2.1.1 Supply of cotton 
 
The world production of cotton is expected to reach 25 millions tons in 2006/7, and 
the average growth rate over the past 30 years appears to be 2,2% per annum. 
Cotton is widely produced in more than one hundred countries (among which 59 
produce on more than 5 000 hectares) but the supply tends to  be increasingly 
concentrated by the four main producers (China, USA, India and Pakistan) which are 
now responsible for roughly 70% of the total supply, against less than 50% 30 years 
ago, due to the rapid increase of the Chinese, Indian an Pakistanis production.  Other 
countries have also significantly increased their production capacity in the last 
decade, in particular Australia, Brazil and Turkey, while other have decreased (in 
particular countries belonging to the former USSR). The West and Central African 
producers, which had a very marginal rank in the world market forty years ago 
(around 30 000 tonnes), have also considerably increased their production capacity, 
and account now for more than 1 million tonnes, thus representing over 4% of the 
world production. 
 
The evolution of world production over the last decades is shown on the table below 
(in Tons of lint): 
 
 
Average 
growth 
1970-2004 
Average 
1970-71 
Average 
growth 
1970-1980
Average 
1980-81
Average 
growth 
1980-1990
Average 
1990-91 
Average 
growth  
1990-2005 
Average 
2000-05
USA 2,2% 2 219 0,9% 2 422 3,4% 3 376 2,4% 4 261
China 3,4% 1 995 3,1% 2 707      5 363
India 4,1% 909 3,8% 1 322 4,2% 1 989 4,5% 3 077
Pakistan 4,4% 543 2,8% 714 8,7% 1 638 1,8% 1 949
ex USSR -2,8% 2 342 1,3% 2 661 -0,3% 2 593 -9,1% 998
W and C Africa 6,6% 140 4,8% 224 9,6% 562 5,5% 964
Turkey 2,7% 400 2,3% 500 2,7% 655 3,3% 902
Australia 11,1% 19 17,9% 99 15,9% 433 0,2% 441
Brazil 2,6% 549 1,3% 623 1,4% 717 5,1% 1 183
Geece 4,2% 110 0,4% 115 6,4% 213 6,0% 380
World 2,1% 11 740 1,7% 13 831 3,2% 18 970 1,5% 21 971
% W and C 
Africa2   1,19%   1,62%   2,96%   4,39%
 
 
2.1.2 Cotton trade  
 
One third of the world production is exported, which makes cotton one of the main 
traded agricultural commodities. The main users are China, followed by India and 
Pakistan, these three countries representing more than 50% of the world 
consumption. Their consumption is rapidly increasing, with the development of their 
textile industry, in relation with the end of the Multi-fibre Agreement, which 
                                                
2 Bénin, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, République centrafricaine, Sénégal, 
Tchad, Togo 
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suppressed the import quotas in developed countries. In parallel, consumption in the 
USA and Europe has been constantly declining, because of the delocalisation of the 
textile industry.  
 
Despite its growing production, China is now, by far, the main world importer of 
cotton. The demand for cotton imports by China, which fluctuates from one year to 
the other, due to local climatic conditions, is therefore a determining factor on the 
global supply and demand balance, and, thus on prices.  
 
The main exporters or cotton are the USA, followed, as a group, by West and Central 
African countries, which now account globally for 13% of the world exports, and thus 
have become  a major player in the cotton world trade. 
 
The main producers, consumers, importers and exporters for the period 2002/2005 
are summarised and illustrated on the table and figures below (lint): 
 
 
Main countries (1000 Tons)Production % Consumption % Exports % Imports % 
W and C Africa 963 4.4% 191 0.9% 889 12.6%   0.0% 
Australia 441 2.0% 19 0.1% 487 6.9% 14 0.2% 
Brazil 1 183 5.4% 852 3.8% 236 3.3% 95 1.3% 
China 5 363 24.4% 7 250 32.7% 69 1.0% 1 448 20.4%
USA 4 261 19.4% 1 424 6.4% 2 834 40.2% 10 0.1% 
India 3 077 14.0% 3 033 13.7% 114 1.6% 190 2.7% 
Uzbekistan 998 4.5% 274 1.2% 711 10.1% 1 0.0% 
Pakistan 1 948 8.9% 2 133 9.6% 74 1.0% 268 3.8% 
Turkey 902 4.1% 1 397 6.3% 59 0.8% 565 8.0% 
EU 466 2.1% 734 3.3% 350 5.0% 585 8.2% 
Total World 21 970 100.0% 22 141 100.0% 7 054 100.0% 7 106 100.0%
 
Main countriesinvolved in the cotton sector (Average years 2002 - 2005)
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2.1.3  Demand trends 
 
The world demand has, overall, increased at the same rhythm as production over the 
3 last decades. It has however been evidenced that the per capita consumption 
remains stable, while the market share of cotton among all textile fibres has been 
reduced over the last 30 years from 60% to 40%, because of the rise of synthetic 
fibres, the characteristics of which have constantly improved. The loss in market 
share for cotton seems, according to all available studies, to be a long-term trend, 
irrelevant of the respective prices of cotton and synthetic fibres. The continuous price 
increase of oil prices, which has a direct effect on the price of synthetic fibres, may 
however have a positive effect in the future on the demand for cotton, and therefore 
on the cotton prices. 
 
2.1.4 Long and medium term price trend 
 
Cotton world prices seem to be affected by a long-term negative trend, as evidenced 
by the graph below. The magnitude of this trend depends of course of the period of 
time taken into consideration. On a 40 years period, the trend would be – 0,24% per 
annum, which is twice the average trend for agricultural commodities. This negative 
trend seems to have increased during the last 10 to 15 years up to 1% or more, 
probably due to a combination of factors: 
 
- the average yield of cotton has continuously increased, especially in the main 
producing countries (it has increased, as a world average, from 400 kg/ha to 654 
between 1980 and 2005), while production costs have decreased, because of 
higher yields and because of the recent introduction of genetically modified 
cotton, which represents nowadays around 50% of the world production. 
 
- as already mentioned, there have been substantial production increases in 
several countries (Brazil, Australia, Turkey) 
 
- finally the market has been distorted by the subsidies on cotton production and 
exports paid in the USA, and, until recently, in Europe (the total amount of 
subsidies was estimated in average at 4 billion dollars per year between 1999 
and 2004). The real impact of those subsidies on cotton prices is a controversial 
issue, and its estimate varies, as several studies give very diverging figures. In a 
recent publication, ICAC, usually considered as one of the most reliable sources, 
estimated that, without subsidies, cotton prices would have been 10% higher 
between 2002 and 2004. In addition to this direct impact, it is clear that such 
subsidies result in a lack of transmission of market signals to producers, and 
therefore tend to prevent the supply to be adjusted to demand, thus amplifying 
price fluctuations. Some studies thus argue that a suppression of US subsidies 
would immediately result in a drop by 15% of US production (which is exported to 
a large extent, and therefore has a strong influence on world prices). 
 
 8
World price of cotton lint
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
jan
-94
ao
˛-9
4
ma
rs-
95
oc
t-9
5
ma
i-9
6
De
c-9
6
jui
l-9
7
fˇv
-98
se
p-9
8
av
r-9
9
no
v-9
9
jui
n-0
0
jan
-01
ao
˛-0
1
ma
rs-
02
oc
t-0
2
ma
i-0
3
dˇc
-03
jui
l-0
4
fˇv
-05
se
p-0
5
cents/kg
Linˇaire (cents/kg)
 
 
2.1.5 Price prospects 
 
Cotton market prices are best reflected, as concerns African cotton, through the daily 
Cotton outlook index A, which gives price quotations provided by the major traders. 
These index prices are expressed in C+F terms (Far East), from which the FOB price 
can be derived by subtracting 0,45 cents/lb ($ 0,1/kg) corresponding to freight, 
insurance and miscellaneous export costs. 
  
After 3 recent market crises (in 1999/200, in 2001/2003 and in 2004/05), cotton prices 
have remained within au tunnel between 55 cents/lb and 59 c/lb since the beginning 
of 2006, which shows a light improvement over the past years (the average price 
between 2001 and 2005 was at 55 cents/lb). The short and medium term price 
prospects depend mainly on the following variables: 
 
- Chinese import needs, which depend mainly on local climatic conditions 
 
- The evolution of the negotiations on trade liberalisation (Doha round) within the 
World Trade Organisation: in response to a claim from a number of African 
producing countries, the European Union decided in 2005 to eliminate the link 
between production and subsidies on cotton, thus eliminating incentives on 
production, which had, in the past, a clearly distortive effect;  the USA decided to 
put an end (in 2006) to its export support programme on cotton, but the last WTO 
conference held in Hong-Kong at the end of 2005, failed to obtain a US 
commitment to stop their domestic support programme on cotton, considered as 
the most distortive on markets and prices. Negotiations are still going on. If an 
agreement is however reached in the coming months, leading to the end of the 
US domestic support programme, it will result in a sharp fall of US production, 
which will have most probably an immediate effect on prices. Such a rise in price 
may however be offset in the medium term by the supply response from some 
countries (in particular Brazil) which have an important production potential and 
are able to switch rapidly from one crop to another, depending on market 
outlooks. 
 
In the longer term, the cotton price prospect will be affected by several factors: 
 
- The capacity of China (main cotton producer, consumer and importer) to sustain 
the same rhythm of production increase as in the past: many experts believe that 
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such a rhythm is not sustainable in the long term, because of competition with 
food crops, in a context where agricultural land is limited.  
 
- Production costs: the world average production cost in FOB terms was estimated 
by ICAC in 2004 at $1,14/kg (52 cents/lb) which corresponds to a C+F cost of 
roughly $1,24/kg (or 56,5 cents/lb), but some countries among the most dynamic 
ones (Brazil, Pakistan, Argentina, Australia…) have costs below $1(45 cents/lb). 
At current prices, cotton is  close to the breakeven price based on the world 
average, but still profitable in those countries, and growing production trends 
should therefore not be affected. The situation may however be different if oil 
prices continue to rise and exceed, for instance, $100 per barrel. At such a level, 
mechanised cotton producers (for instance in Brazil and Australia) will be heavily 
penalised in terms of production costs. 
 
- The world demand for cotton, which may increase faster than in the past, due an 
increase of the market share of cotton, in case of a continuous and sharp 
increase of oil prices. 
 
Based on those considerations, ICAC forecasts a medium term (2008/2010) price 
relatively stable around 60 cents/lb. The World Bank is more optimistic, mainly 
because of a more restrictive perception of the production capacity of China, and 
considers a price of 63 cents/lb in 2010 and 65 cents in 2015. In conclusion, 
considering the fact that ICAC forecasts are usually more accurate than the World 
bank's ones concerning cotton and considering production costs, it seems prudent to 
anticipate an FOB medium term price of 60 cents/lb (in constant value). In the longer 
term (after 2015), the decreasing trend may be expected to continue, unless further 
increase of the oil prices. 
 
2.2 Cotton production in Central and West Africa 
 
Cotton is grown in West and Central Africa between isohyets 800 and 1200, mainly in 
three geographical areas located, for the first one, in Mali, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast 
and Ghana, for the second one in Togo and Benin, and for the third one, in Chad and 
Cameroon. As shown on the table below, the total production has doubled over the 
past decade, showing a growth rate particularly high in Burkina Faso, Benin,  and 
Cameroon. 
 
 
Seed 
cotton 
(1000t) 
Benin Burkina Faso RCI Mali Chad Senegal Togo Cameroon RCA Ghana 
Total 
3
 
1993/94 161 163 238 319 121 47,5 105 128 22 22 1 326 
2004/05 427 631 300 587 195 50 172 278 1,5 25 2 666 
Source : Agence française de Développement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 excluding Nigeria, the production of which is estimated by FAO at 135 000 Tons in 1994 and 250 000 
Tons in 2004 
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Cotton growing areas in Central and West Africa 
 
Source : Club du Sahel. 
 
Cotton cultivation in West and Central Africa is entirely rainfed, and concentrated in a 
climatic zone where climatic risks are important. Cropping practices are essentially 
manual (except in Ghana), which makes cotton a very labour intensive crop. Cotton 
requires, in these areas, a relatively important work for weeding, crop protection and 
fertilization. It is usually cultivated in rotation with food crops, in particular maize. 
 
2.3 Organization of the cotton supply chain and price setting mechanisms in 
West and Central Africa 
 
2.3.1 General overview 
 
All cotton companies in the CFA zone were initially built, in the 1950s and 1960s, on 
the same model: a parastatal company operating on a nationwide basis (but restricted 
to areas suitable for cotton cultivation) and assisted by a French parastatal 
specialized in the cotton chain, CFDT (now renamed as DAGRIS). The national 
parastatal had a monopoly on seed cotton and lint marketing. Because there was 
virtually no services available, these parastatals were fully integrated, with all 
downstream and support activities under its control: extension, supply of inputs 
associated with a credit based on seed cotton production as collateral, purchase and 
transport of seed cotton, ginning, marketing of lint and seeds, and, in some cases, oil 
extraction. The State was indeed strongly involved, as the owner of the company (or 
main share holder) and as the main source of financing for the development of the 
sector. 
 
This organization scheme allowed a rapid development of the cotton sector in most 
countries, as it could ensure and secure the provision of inputs and equipment on a 
credit basis, together with technical advises to farmers. It showed however 
progressively its limits: risks of political interferences, lack of incentives of cotton 
companies to optimize their cost and maximize the return to farmers, sometimes lack 
of long term vision and difficulty for the State to play adequately its role of leading 
share holder of the company,….. In such a context, cotton supply chains in CFA zone 
have been, during the last decade, undergoing important organizational changes, 
concerning in particular: 
 
- Targeting the activities of the cotton companies on the key functions of the supply 
chain (extension, purchase of seed cotton, ginning, and marketing), while other 
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support functions are progressively transferred to private companies under 
contract, to farmers associations or to Government public services, 
 
- Withdrawal of the State from the cotton companies, through the coming of new 
private partners or producers associations in the capital of the companies, 
 
- Withdrawal of the State from the overall management of the supply chain, 
through the creation of  an industry-wide board (inter-professional body), 
including the cotton company and farmers associations, and, in some instances, 
the Government as an observer.  
 
These changes are still under way in most concerned countries, and the rhythm of 
reform differs from one country to the other. 
 
Producer price setting and stabilization mechanisms have always been a main 
concern for Central and West Africa cotton producing countries, as in a single buyer 
system, prices have to set at a fixed level for each campaign, on a pan-territorial 
basis. Before liberalization of the cotton sectors, prices were usually set 
administratively at a low level, without reference to world prices. Profits of the cotton 
companies were partly turned to a stabilization fund, supposed to support producer 
prices when world prices are low, but in reality unable to do so, as the funds have 
often been used for other purposes. In view of this failure, most cotton sectors under 
liberalization adopted, during the pas decade, new mechanisms, more transparent 
and under the control of stake holders. As discussed in the following paragraphs, 
these mechanisms were able to avoid drastic price fluctuation for a number of years, 
but none of them has been able to resist the ongoing price crisis.   
 
It should be noted that francophone African cotton producers have been much more 
affected than others by the recent market crisis, as their local currency (CFA Franc), 
bound to the Euro, has been in recent years, overvalued as compared to the dollar, 
resulting in a aggravation of the price decline, when expressed in local currency, as 
shown on the graph below.   
 
Evolution of world prices in dollars and FCFA
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2.3.2 Countries outlook 
 
In Cameroon, the majority of the capital of SODECOTON (the local parastatal 
company) is still with the State, but new shareholders (including DAGRIS) entered, 
and represent now 40% of the shares. A full privatization is considered, but no 
decision has been taken so far. SODECOTON is still a fully integrated company, 
which operates a dense network of extension agents, has its own transport fleet for 
seed cotton, owns all the ginneries, exports, and operates its own oil extraction plant. 
In parallel, local associations of cotton farmers were created, with the assistance of 
SODECOTON, and grouped in an APEX association, which now participates in the 
overall management of the supply chain, in full co-operation with the cotton company: 
they participates in the decision on prices paid to farmers; they have their own self-
insurance fund, fed by price premiums on cotton purchase paid by the cotton 
company; they are taking over progressively extension functions from SODECOTON; 
they manage village level cotton markets, where seed cotton is assembled, thus 
helping the collection by the cotton company. It is worth noting that, though it still has 
the majority of shares in the cotton company, the Government does not interfere in its 
management.   Altogether, the reforms undertaken by SODECOTON can be 
considered as a success. 
 
The price setting mechanism is not formalized: prices are decided jointly by 
SODECOTON and the producers association before the starting of the campaign, 
and a premium is eventually paid to the association if the campaign is profitable. This 
premium feeds a fund belonging to the producers, or may be used, if so decided by 
the association, to complement the producers price the following campaign. In 
addition, SODECOTON has its own reserve fund, which may be used when world 
prices are low to complement the producers price or replenished when world prices 
are high and the company profitable. This informal scheme worked successfully for a 
decade and was able to stabilize producers prices, but all the reserves accumulated 
by the two funds were used in the two last campaigns, during which SODECOTON 
incurred heavy losses, as the producer price remained well above the breakeven 
point. 
 
In Senegal, the parastatal (SODEFITEX) has been privatized in 2004, as the majority 
of shares have been sold from the Government to the French cotton operator 
DAGRIS. A part of the capital is further planned to be transferred to the Producers 
association, but the transfer is still under way.  
 
The cotton company is still fully integrated, and operates a subsidiary in charge of 
rural development in the cotton growing area. DAGRIS has shown up to now no 
intention to transfer support functions to private contractors. A shareholders 
agreement, signed between the Government and DAGRIS when the privatization took 
place, defines the management objectives of the company and mutual obligations. A 
cotton sector management committee was also created, grouping, as members, the 
cotton company, the Government and the Producers association. The main function 
of this committee is to set each year the price of seed cotton (pan-territorial price for 
the duration of the whole campaign) and to manage a support fund for cotton prices, 
which has been existing since 1994.  
 
This fund is supposed to be fed by the cotton company when it makes profits and to 
be used, otherwise, to compensate the losses of the company. This system allowed 
the cotton company to maintain relatively high prices until 2005, but became bankrupt 
in 2005/6, leading the Government to compensate the losses incurred to the cotton 
company. A new mechanism is now considered by the Cotton management 
committee (comité interprofessionnel) , which should have more binding operating 
rules and might be shaped upon the new system recently designed in Burkina Faso. 
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The Government is planning to withdraw from the Cotton management committee, 
but is still supporting actively the sector, considered as essential for the development 
of the southern part of the country, as it does for other strategic agricultural sectors, 
through subsidies to the support funds (when necessary) and to subsidies on inputs.  
 
In Mali, the parastatal cotton company, CMDT, has still a full monopoly on cotton 
marketing, but has withdrawn progressively from a number of support functions: it has 
abandoned its role of rural development institution in the cotton zone; it is not 
responsible anymore for road maintenance in the cotton area; it has sold out its 
subsidiary for oil extraction; it has withdrawn from input supply, which is now taken 
over by farmers cooperatives (still using seed cotton as a collateral). 
 
As there were evidences of a poor management of the cotton company (which 
accumulated heavy losses in the past years), the donors have insisted on the need to 
privatize CMDT, which met a strong resistance from Government and was postponed 
several times. It has finally been decided that it would take place in 2008, including: 
 
- A dismantlement of CMDT 
 
- Creation of 4 private regional cotton companies, which would have a monopoly in 
their respective zones 
 
- Creation of an APEX cooperative of cotton producers, grouping the local 
cooperatives 
 
- Creation of an APEX association (Interprofession), grouping the new national 
cooperative of producers and the industry; this new association will be in charge 
of the overall management of the supply chain 
 
- Creation of a quality control company, owned by the Apex association. 
 
The price setting mechanism changed several times. Following the collapse of former 
mechanisms, a new one was designed in 2002, based on the following principles:  
 
- A minimum price to producers is calculated on the basis of the estimated 
production cost; this price is paid to the producer, irrelevant of the fiber price, 
during the campaign 
 
- A theoretical profit/loss of the cotton company is calculated at the end of the 
campaign on the basis of standard costs; if the result is a profit, it is shared 
between the producers, the cotton company and the price support fund; if it is a 
loss, it is borne by the fund. 
 
This mechanism proved to be inadequate, as it resulted in heavy losses exceeding 
the contributing capacity of fund. An agreement was reached in 2005 for a new 
system, for the 3 coming campaigns, according to which: the producer price would be 
set at 160 FCFA/kg, but could be even lowered if world prices make it necessary; the 
estimated profit of the campaign (on the basis on standard prices and costs) would be 
shared between producers (60%) and the cotton company (40%); the share 
belonging to the producers could either paid to them or capitalized in a price support 
fund (belonging to the producers association), the creation of which is however not a 
condition for the operation of the mechanism. A study is currently under way for the 
feasibility of the fund.  
 
In Burkina Faso, the Government sold shares of the parastatal, SOFITEX, to Dagris, 
local banks and the association of producers in 2001, thus losing the majority in the 
capital. The company has a monopoly on cotton marketing, and is fully integrated, 
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with its own (limited) extension network and its input supply scheme. More recently, 
SOFITEX has withdrawn from 2 zones, where private companies (FASO COTON and 
SOCOMA, controlled by DAGRIS and by a major cotton trader Reinhart) are now 
operating, also with local monopoly and full integration.  
 
In parallel, the local cotton growers associations have created an APEX, the National 
Union of cotton producers of Burkina. In 2006, an APEX body grouping producers, 
the cotton companies (inter-professional body) and the Government as an "observer", 
was created, and given full responsibility for the management of the supply chain, in 
particular for setting up operating rules and prices (pan-territorial fixed price 
throughout the campaign). Following this move, it can be considered that the 
Government has virtually withdrawn from the sector.  
 
A price setting and support mechanism was established in 1999, through an 
agreement between the industry and producers. It was based on:  
 
- A minimum producer price of 175 FCFA/kg;  
 
- The setting up of a floor FOB price (650 FCFA/kg), above which SOFITEX is 
supposed to make profits, and under which SOFITEX receives a compensation 
from the support fund;  
 
- A sharing  of the profit of the campaign between the support fund, SOFITEX  and 
producers (their share is distributed, and a price premium, at the following 
campaign) 
 
- A support fund used to cover the estimated losses of SOFITEX and finance some 
support functions (in particular road maintenance) and replenished when world 
prices are above the floor price. 
 
This system worked until 2005, but was unable to cover the losses of the cotton 
companies for the campaign 2004/5, generating a severe cash crisis, which is now 
threatening the whole supply chain. A new mechanism was therefore urgently set up 
in 2006, differing mainly from the previous one on the fact that producers prices would 
be set on the basis of the world market (95% of the average of FOB prices for the 3 
past campaigns and forecast for the 3 coming campaigns), with no more minimum 
price; this change resulted in a decrease of the producer price from 175 to 165 FCFA. 
It has however not solved the cash problem of the cotton companies, which is likely to 
worsen in 2006/7, as the producers prices is probably still above the break even 
point.   
 
In Benin, the privatization process started earlier than in other countries, and has 
gone much further. The monopoly of the parastatal, SONAPRA, was suppressed in 
2000, following advises from the World Bank, and new private ginneries were 
authorized. SONAPRA is furthermore scheduled to be privatized shortly. An APEX 
association (AIC), created in 1999, groups all the stake holders in the supply chain, 
including producers associations and ginners, and a producers' cooperative is in 
charge of coordinating private input suppliers. while the overall coordination of the 
supply chain is given to AIC.  
 
This complex organization, the first one to set up in francophone countries to replace 
the monopoly of the parastatal company, has not given the expected results: the new 
system does not really foster competition among actors, especially ginners, as the 
sale of seed cotton to the ginners is decided, without competition, by SONAPRA, on 
the basis of a quota system; the newcomers in the ginnery industry do not play by the 
rules, and, in some instances, lack professionalism; the coordination body remains 
very weak, and, finally, despite the liberalization, the Government is interfering 
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constantly in the management of the supply chain, in particular, through SONAPRA. 
These shortcomings have resulted in heavy posses for the supply chain, delayed 
payments to farmers, and, finally, in a sharp decrease in production.  
 
In Togo, the marketing of lint was liberalized in the last decade, allowing a number of 
private ginneries (SICOT, SOPIC and SOCOSA), to be created, while the parastatal 
SOTOCO has kept the monopoly on the collection of seed cotton. Despite a 
remarkable growth in the 1990's, as production increased from 63 500 tons in 1987 to 
187 000 in 1998, the sector has been facing during the last 5 years a major crisis, 
resulting in a recent decline in production, yields and number of farmers. This 
situation is mainly due to the insolvency of SOTOCO, who has accumulated losses, 
because of poor management, unrealistic producers prices in a context of declining 
world prices, and lack of cost efficiency. As a result, SOTOCO has accumulated 
debts (nearly 50 billions FCFA in 2006), in particular to producers, who are not paid 
anymore upon delivery of the seed cotton, and are therefore discouraged and 
compelled to extensification. The insolvency of SOTOCO may result in a general 
liquidity problem for banks and for the whole economy. A recovery programme is 
currently being studied.  
 
2.3.3 The cotton price fixation system in Ghana 
 
In Ghana, the seed cotton price fixation system is based on discussions between the 
producers and the cotton companies, held before the sowing period (month of April). 
During the discussions, two approaches are used: 
 
- Producers take into consideration (i) the costs of production, including the cost of 
casual and family labor, (ii) the expected average yield, and (iii) add a profit per 
hectare, resulting in a minimum price in Cedis per kg of seed cotton, 
 
- Cotton companies consider the world price of cotton lint (and secondarily the 
price of cotton seed), deduct the various costs between the seed cotton cost and 
CIF lint and seed prices (transport, ginning, administrative costs, profit), and 
calculate a maximum price for seed cotton. 
 
Those two methods often lead to incompatible figures, producers wanting prices that 
cotton companies consider as unacceptable for them, taking into consideration the 
situation of the world market. The main topic of disagreement is usually the cost of 
labor at farm level, since it is difficult to assess the proportion of hired and family 
labor. The situation has become particularly difficult in the year 2006, with low world 
prices for cotton lint and cotton companies facing years of losses. Producers, 
proposing a price for seed cotton of Cedis 3 000 / kg (same as in 2004 and 2005), 
could not agree with cotton companies who proposed a price of Cedis 2 850 / kg. 
Producers threatened to stop producing cotton and GCCL finally accepted the price of 
3 000 / kg, the other companies having therefore no choice but to accept it.  
 
This kind of situation is neither satisfactory and nor sustainable; an objective and 
neutral price fixation system should be agreed upon by the producers and the cotton 
companies, enabling both stake holders to live from the cotton production.  
 
From the experience obtained in francophone countries, it appears that the following 
principles should apply in order to set up a proper seed cotton price fixation system: 
 
- A system based on a negotiation between producers and cotton companies using 
both the costs of production and the world market leads systemically to over 
priced seed cotton when the world prices are low, leading to losses for the cotton 
companies (present situation in Ghana, and also in most francophone countries),  
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- There cannot be any objective estimation of the costs of production, since they 
are based on theoretical hypothesis, especially in terms of yield per hectare and 
cost of the family labor, 
 
- Both stake holders should agree on an objective formula for the calculation of the 
seed cotton price, based on the lint world market and easily computed costs 
between the lint price and the ginneries (transport costs, FOB to CIF costs, 
norms for ginning and administrative costs), 
 
- World prices should use forward index, and there could be a two stage price 
fixation system: (i) an indicative, prudent bottom price could be set up before the 
sowing period, enabling the farmers to decide whether they will (or not) grow 
cotton), and (ii) a final price determined after the sales, based on real prices 
(average Cotlook spot index) of lint. In case of an extra price obtained from 
higher than expected lint price, the benefit could be shared between producers 
and cotton companies, using an agreed key of allocation.   
 
2.3.4 Lessons learnt on price setting systems and ways to protect producers against drastic 
price fluctuations 
 
Recent reviews of the existing systems as well as studies (in particular by Agence 
Française de Développement) on new possible mechanisms have come to the 
conclusion that, in order to ensure a producer price fixed throughout the campaign 
and disclosed before the campaign, a price setting mechanism, associated with a 
mechanism to "smooth" price fluctuations, was necessary to the development and 
even to the survival of cotton sectors. Such a mechanism should correspond to a 
number of criteria: 
 
- The mechanism should be part of an agreement between producers and 
industry, and should be under the control and management of an inter-
professional body 
 
- The setting of the producer price, which is to be done before the start of the 
campaign, should however not be left to a negotiation between stake holders, 
which has proved to systematically lead to mis-estimation of the world price 
trends; it should be made on the basis of a mathematical and transparent 
formula, using verifiable parameters and leaving no space to interpretation. This 
formula should be based on the world price trend, but should be shaped so as to 
smooth too drastic variations of the world market; the best way to do so is to 
base it on the exponentially weighted average between the average Cotton 
Outlook Index for the 3 previous campaign and the forward index for the coming 
campaign at the time prices have to be set (in April). 
 
- The setting of the producer price should be prudent (i. e. the price should be 
slightly lower than the average trend mentioned above), so as to limit the risk of a 
price fall during the campaign; the best way to do so is to associate it with the 
payment of a premium to producers in case the average world price turns up to 
be higher than the trend. The premium paid to producers corresponds to the 
share of the estimated profit of the supply chain allocated to them. 
 
- The calculation of the estimated profit and of the share of this profit allocated to 
producers cannot not be based on actual costs and selling prices of cotton 
companies, which would not be incentive to maximize cost efficiency and is 
virtually impossible to verify; it should rather be based either on standard cost 
(calculated by independent consultants) and Cotton Outlook Index, or on a fixed 
percentage of the average world price (as in the new  schemes in Burkina and 
Mali, where producers receive 60% of world prices, and cotton companies 40%). 
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- A price support or smoothing fund is necessary to cover or reduce the risks of 
loss for the cotton company, if actual prices fall below the reference on the basis 
of which the producer price was calculated; this fund should be operated by a 
private bank, on the basis of well defined rules, under the control of the inter-
professional body; there should be clear mechanisms to replenish automatically 
the fund when the cotton company is estimated to make a profit (i. e., the profit 
sharing scheme should allocate a part of the estimated profit to the fund, before 
sharing the remainder between producers and cotton companies). The ceiling of 
the fund (above which no replenishment is necessary) should ideally be around 
$0,2/kg of lint exported, in order to cope with possible world price fluctuations. 
 
Market tools (futures, put and call options on futures…) can also contribute to reduce 
the risks born by the cotton companies and mitigate the impact of price fluctuations 
on stake holders. Their use, however, requires a specific training of the cotton 
company and an access to future markets, which is not ensured in the present 
regulatory context.  
 
 
3 SITUATION OF THE COTTON SECTOR IN GHANA 
 
 
3.1 Historical background 
 
The promotion of cotton production was initiated during the sixties, and has shown a 
rather chaotic evolution during the next decades, with various changes of policies; the 
table below summarizes the main stages of evolution of the cotton industry in Ghana: 
 
Date Decision/Reform 
June 1968 Establishment of the Cotton Development Board 
1985 Transformation of the CDB into the Ghana Cotton Company Ltd, Govt. of Ghana holding 
30% of shares. Other shareholders were textile companies, input suppliers and the 
Agricultural Development Bank 
Establishment of Nulux and PDL Cotton Companies 
Inputs supplied “free” to farmers. Compensated by lower buying prices 
1986 Entry of several other Companies into the industry (Juni Agro, Agro star, Upper West 
Cotton Promotion Ltd., Intercontinental Farms, Bafcot)  
1995 Sales of 30% shares in GCCL by Government 
Start of supply of inputs as “in-kind” loans to cotton farmers by GCCL 
Diversion of inputs becoming a disturbing problem 
1996/97 Twelve Cotton Companies involved in cotton production 
Role of Government becomes insignificant (indirect influence only through the ADB) 
1997/98 Set-up of the Cotton growers’ Association 
1999/2000 Cotton Companies become alarmed by the level of poaching 
2000 to 
2002 
Tentative Zoning in cotton areas 
2000 ADB stops financing private Cotton Companies, because of their heavy debts 
2003/04 Tentative privatisation, aborted, of GCCL 
2004/05 ADB takes control of GCCL, through a debt-equity swap 
2004 Small companies are not active anymore in the cotton sector 
April 2006 Setup of a “Standing Committee” 
 
 18
Recognising the potential of Ghana to cultivate cotton, the government of Ghana in 
1968 set up the Cotton Development Board (CDB) with the mandate to stimulate the 
production of cotton, ensure adequate supply of raw materials to local textile 
industries and undertake research on improved varieties. 
 
To achieve their mandate, CDB provided registered cotton growers with cotton seeds, 
fertilizers, insecticides, tractor and extension services and in turn bought the seed 
cotton produced, ginned and sold the lint cotton. Initially, this aroused the interest of 
farmers and production increased gradually reaching a peak in 1976. After 1977 
production fell continuously due to declining producer prices relative to food crops. 
 
CDB continued to experience problems and upon the recommendation of the World 
Bank, it was privatized and became the Ghana Cotton Company in 1985, with 30% 
shares taken by government. The cotton sector was also liberalized and this saw the 
entry of several other cotton companies. With financial support from the Agricultural 
Development Bank (ADB), cotton companies provided cotton seed free to farmers 
and fertilizers, insecticides and tractor services on credit which they recovered when 
farmers sold their seed cotton to them. 
This unlimited liberalization ushered in a period of extensive malpractices by all key 
actors. While cotton companies poached farmers of other cotton companies and 
offered bad quality services, farmers received inputs from one company but sold their 
seed cotton to another and thereby avoided payment for input supplied. Some 
farmers also registered with two or more cotton companies and received inputs from 
different companies for the same cotton farm and diverted some of the inputs for their 
food crops or sold inputs in the open market. Cotton production assistants (CPAs) 
employed by the cotton companies also cheated by presenting ‘ghost’ names and 
receiving inputs and selling these.  
 
These occurrences led to high indebtedness of the cotton companies to ADB which 
from year 2000 ceased to fund cotton companies. Consequently, several of the 
smaller cotton companies are unable to provide input for their farmers and have 
suspended operations.  
 
To address crises in the sector and to bring sanity to the operations of the companies 
and the farmers, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) introduced in 2000-
2001 the principle of zoning by which the cotton growing areas were zoned for 
particular companies. This meant that farmers within a zone were limited to dealing 
only with the company assigned to operate in that zone.  
 
Some cotton companies were unhappy with zones assigned to them and others made 
incursions into zones of other companies. Some farmers also refused to work with 
companies assigned to them and refused to cultivate cotton. The source of the 
complaints was mainly because both farmers and cotton companies felt they had not 
been adequately involved in the process. 
 
After about five years, the zoning has come to stay and farmers and companies alike 
have come to accept it as good and confirm that the zoning has led to reductions in 
the malpractices that existed. They are however calling for a review to make it more 
aligned to the situation on the ground. 
 
In 1999, when zoning was being introduced there were about 16 companies operating 
within the cotton industry but due to factors such as low returns on investments, low 
cotton lint prices on the world market, high interest rates on commercial loans, most 
of them have collapsed leaving only four companies. The table below presents an 
overview of the zones in existence as at 2005: 
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Currently operating Cotton Companies and zones 
Company Zone / Districts Hectares under cultivation in 2006 
Nulux Plantation Limited Saboba/Chereponi District 
Gidanturu (East Gonja) 
1,930 
Intercontinental Farms Limited Gambaga (East Mamprusi District) 1,000 
Plantation Development Limited Wa 
Bole 
Nandawli 
Jirapa/lambushi 
1,545 
Ghana Cotton Company Limited Yendi District 
Savelugu/Nanton District 
West Mamprusi District 
Nakpanduri (East Mamprusi District) 
Sissila East and West 
Bawku- Zebilla District, 
Bunkpurugu District 
Bolgatanga, 
Builsa- Sandema District 
15,068 
 
Source: MOFA, Northern Region and Cotton Companies 
 
3.2 Situation of cotton growing area IN Northern Ghana 
 
3.2.1 Population 
 
The cultivation of cotton has the potential of becoming a major cash crop in northern 
Ghana and as some put it become “the cocoa of the north” given the needed boost. 
The lack of a viable cash crop in northern Ghana has been associated with the 
pronounced poverty in the three northern regions, as farmers in these regions depend 
mainly on their food crops for both food supplies for their families and cash incomes. 
 
Ghana experienced growing and deepening poverty in the 1980s and 90s, an 
evidence of intensification of vulnerability and exclusion among some groups and in 
some areas, especially in the north of the country and the Central Region. Moreover, 
population growth during the period far outstripped the rate of decrease in poverty 
levels.  
  
According to the Ghana Poverty Strategy, five  out  of  ten  regions  in  Ghana  had 
more  than  40% of  their  population  living  in poverty in 1999.  The worst affected 
being the three northern savannah regions (the Upper East, Upper West and 
Northern Regions).  Nine out of ten people in the Upper East; eight out of ten in 
Upper West, seven out of ten in Northern Region and five out of ten in Central and 
Eastern Regions were classified as poor in 1999 as shown in the figure below. 
 
The Annex 1 and the graph below shows how the three northern regions of Ghana 
are the poorest ones:  
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Contrary to other regions, the situation has not improved during the nineties, the 
proportion of people living under the poverty line having increased, as shown in the 
graph below: 
Proportion of population below poverty line from 1991/92 to 
1998/99
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Food crop farmers in the country have the highest incidence of poverty. They 
constitute fifty-nine percent (59%) of the poor in Ghana. This has been due to several 
factors including lack of access to markets, high cost of inputs and low levels of 
economic infrastructure.  
 
Poverty reduction in the north where over 70% of the active population are engaged 
in agriculture and related activities, will not happen with increases in food crop 
 21
production unless there are allied industries to process and market the excess food. 
Increasing food crop production alone can only lead to a slum in the prices of 
products and lower incomes for farmers. Developing cotton as a major cash crop in 
northern Ghana has a better potential of reducing poverty. Already over 250,000 farm 
families are benefiting from cotton production. Cotton provides a source of 
employment as well as income security when food crop production fails. Cotton 
engages some of the youth and helps to minimize the rural-urban drift. 
 
3.2.2 Land issues 
 
3.2.2.1 Land availability 
 
With the lowest density of population in Ghana, availability of land for cultivation is 
usually not a challenge for northern farmers and farmers interacted during field 
studies confirm that finding more land for cultivation is not a problem. 57.1 percent of 
the total land area of Ghana is suitable for agriculture and only 30.2 percent is 
currently under cultivation. The situation is however contrasted within Northern 
Ghana, with much higher densities of population in Upper East (higher than 100 / 
km2) than in other parts of the north. 
 
Cotton is by far a more suited cash crop for the climatic conditions of the north as it is 
drought resistant and can stand the long dry spells. Northern Ghana belongs to the 
climatic zone of Northern Savanna (Guinea and Sudan Savanna woodland). The 
region has a unimodal rainfall distribution with a mean annual rainfall of 1,000 to 
1,100mm and which gives it a single growing season in a year. The climate is hot and 
dry with average temperatures between 28.9 and 40C. 
 
3.2.2.2 Soil Fertility 
 
Soils in Ghana have predominantly light textured surface horizons in which sandy 
loams and loams are common. Lower soil horizons have slightly heavier textures 
varying from coarse sandy loams to clays. Many soils contain abundant coarse 
material either gravel and stone, or concretionary materials which affect their physical 
properties, particularly their water holding capacity. 
The table below shows some average soil characteristics in the three regions: 
 
Region Soil  pH % Organic matter 
%Total 
Nitrogen 
Available 
Phosphorus 
(mg/kg soil) 
Available 
Calcium 
(mg/kg soil) 
Upper East 5.1-6.8 1.1-2.5 0.06-0.14 1.75-14.75 43.5-151.5 
Upper West 6.0-6.8 0.5-1.3 0.01-0.07 2.0-7.4 52-151.5 
Northern 4.5-6.7 0.6-2.0 0.02-0.05 2.5-10.0 45-90 
Source: Soil Research Institute, CSIR-Kumasi 
 
The soils of the three regions are usually rather poor, with very low levels of organic 
mater and all major chemicals needed for any crop; therefore, to intensify and to 
obtain high yields require the use of important quantities of fertilizer and/or organic 
matter. 
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3.3 Evolution of cotton production in Ghana, comparison with other African 
countries 
 
3.3.1 Evolution of production 
 
The graph below (and Annex 2) shows the evolution of cotton production since 1968 ; 
it has always been rather erratic, contrary to the situation in neighbouring countries, 
where cotton played a major role in developping the rural populations ; the production 
never reached 40 000 T of seed-cotton in Ghana. 
 
Evolution of seed-cotton production in Ghana since 1968
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The comparison between Ghana and Burkina Faso is striking (graph below), Burkina 
is actually producing more cotton each year (since 2004) than the total cumulated 
production of Ghana since 1968 ! The comparison between other Western and 
Central African countries (see Annex 2) shows that Ghana lies far behind all cotton 
producing countries, even much smaller countries (Togo for instance) or countries 
where the natural resources are far less favourable than in Ghana (Senegal). Ghana 
cotton production amounts for less than 1% of the West and Central African 
production, although having excellent conditions for its development. Ghana is the 
only country in West and Central Africa that has not developped its cotton production 
and it is crucial to understand the causes of such a situation before desiging any new 
project aiming at rewamping this industry. 
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Evolution of seed-cotton production in Ghana and Burkina Faso since 
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3.3.2 Causes to low production 
 
The major reasons explaining this situation can be summarized as follows:  
 
- Low involvement of Government (MOFA), changing policies and lack of 
regulation, 
 
- Poor organisation of the sector, lack of confidence among the stakeholders,  
 
- No or little development of animal traction, basis of the increase of the cotton 
cultivated area in other countries, 
 
- Poor organisation of farmers, and low unattractive prices for seed-cotton. 
 
A more indepth reason, linked to some historical origins, is that relations between 
cotton companies and farmers have not been, during a long period of time, relations 
between responsible and independent suppliers. Cotton companies considered 
farmers as land and labour providers, “temporary workers” who lended thair land and 
labour force to the them4, and to whom the companies were providing the minimum 
necessary inputs for the cultivation of cotton (the companies also took care of the 
land preparation) ; the farmers would sell the seed-cotton to companies, at a price 
decided by the companies, with little relation with the cotton lint world price. This kind 
of relations does not promote reponsible behaviour among farmers, many of them still 
considering that there cannot be fair and trustful partnership betwwen them and the 
cotton companies. The behaviour of some companies (especially the “purchase 
companies”) has encouraged this kind of unresponsible behaviour, by helping the 
farmers to cheat and not repay the loans they had benefited for input supply.  
 
The change of such way of thinking is a long term issue, and only fair and trustful 
policy will be able to set-up proper and normal relations between cotton growers and 
cotton companies. 
 
                                                
4 The name of several cotton companies « … Plantations », is an “illustration” of such way of thinking  
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The main lessons learned from neighbouring countries are that three main conditions 
have to be met in order to guaranty the long-term development of the cotton sector 
(apart from the fact that cotton should be a reasonably profitable crop for the 
farmers): 
 
- Long-term transparent policy should prevail ; clear and enforced rules for all 
stakeholders are the only way to bring confidence among stake-holders, 
 
- An efficient credit-based input supply system should be established enabling the 
supply of good quality inputs to the cotton growers, at reasonable cost and at the 
right time of the year,  
 
- Fair and transparent seed-cotton price fixing system, enabling early payment to 
cotton growers, 
 
 
3.4 Organisation, Institutions and functions within the cotton sector 
 
3.4.1 Farming strategies/cotton motivation and socio-economic constraints of rural 
communities 
 
3.4.1.1 Cotton vs. Food crops 
 
As elsewhere in Ghana, agriculture in the north is characterized by small holdings of 
mostly food crops grown with the first objective to ensure food security of the 
household but also to raise cash incomes from the sale of extra food grown. About 
90% of farm holdings in Ghana are less than 2 hectares in size. 
 
Farmers in the north grow several crops. The major crops grown beside cotton are 
maize, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, cowpea, rice, yam and cassava. Intercropping is 
commonly practiced. Apart from cotton which is grown solo, farmers grow their food 
crops in various mixtures, sometimes as many as 6. Livestock especially cattle, 
sheep, goats, fowls and guinea fowls are raised in almost all farm households.   
 
Interaction with farmers in a cotton growing village, Boli in the Wa Central District of 
the Upper West Region confirms the general trend and points to farmers growing as 
many as eight other crops beside cotton. Cotton appears to be third to sorghum and 
groundnuts in terms of area under cultivation in Boli in 2006. 
  
Farmers’ motivation for growing cotton is associated with all the other crops they 
grow. Farmers speculate on the most profitable crop on which to put greater energy. 
Several features of cotton cultivation constitute comparative disadvantage: 
 
- It is a non-food cash crop 
- It must be grown as a sole crop 
- It is very labour-intensive especially at harvest time 
- Its cultural practices are undertaken at almost the same time as staple food crops 
such as millet, groundnuts and sorghum 
- It has high storage risk and cannot be stored to reap higher prices in the lean 
season since the price is fixed for a production season. 
 
Cotton varieties grown are input-intensive and input (i.e. tractor services, fertilizers 
and chemicals) prices have been rising as that of seed cotton has been behind that of 
other crops. This is a discouraging trend. However, cotton farmers still register to 
grow cotton year by year. This apparent paradox is easily understood when one takes 
a few things into consideration: 
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Input supply for other crops 
 
It has been observed that maize and to a lesser extent rice are the main beneficiaries 
of fertilizer diverted from cotton. The importance of maize however goes beyond food 
security to customary reasons. High input prices therefore do the change the habit of 
growing maize. Maize growing on former cotton fields profits from residual fertilizer 
effects.  
 
One basic reason why farmers continue to grow cotton is the fact that the residual 
effect of the fertilizer applied to cotton is very much appreciated by farmers. In most 
cases maize is grown after cotton.  
 
Guaranteed market 
 
In more remote areas such as north of Yendi and Chereponi where access to market 
is difficult, guaranteed transport facilities and fixed prices appear to make cotton 
attractive. 
 
Cash Security 
 
Cotton farmers are aware that cotton provides them with incomes that they use to 
meet various needs that require bulk money. Some of uses of money from cotton 
cultivation mentioned during interactions include roofing of buildings, buying bicycles 
and meeting educational needs of children as well as marriage ceremonies. 
 
3.4.1.2 Constraints to Cotton Production 
 
Several issues were raised during interactions with cotton farmers, cotton companies 
and government as constraining cotton production in Ghana. These include: 
 
Lack of credit 
 
Cotton companies are highly indebted to the Agricultural Development Bank which is 
no longer refinancing. Cotton companies can no longer raise the needed credit to 
finance timely input supply to farmers and payment for seed cotton. Many companies 
have ceased production and the remaining four have reduced size of operation. 
 
Late input delivery 
 
Closely related to lack of credit is late delivery of inputs. Timing is critical for good 
cotton yield. It is estimated that everyday that planting is delayed translates into a loss 
of 15kg yield. The mission has gathered that a two-week delay in planting is common 
due to late ploughing by tractors.  
 
Tractors are in short supply and even though other service providers are brought in 
from the south, they are still not enough leading to delays. These delays could be 
remedied with increased use of animal traction. Land preparation by tractor is also 
more expensive and could lead to compacting of the soil.  
 
Some women also grow cotton on their own and appreciate incomes earned from 
cotton. However, frustrations with tractor services is said to be discouraging for some 
women farmers. 
 
Poor quality seed  
 
The cotton industry in Ghana depends on third or fourth generation seeds imported 
from Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo. These planting materials are usually 
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unreliable. The purchase of recent generation and good quality seed from the 
neighbouring countries cannot be guaranteed and the conditions under which they 
are transported also contribute to the very low viability and vigour of the cotton seed.  
 
Poor seed leads to poor germination rate, the possibility of two or more replanting and 
eventually results in lower plant population. Several fields observed during the 
mission point to this fact.  
 
In order to solve this problem, the cotton companies requested the Savanna 
Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) to develop appropriate genetic materials for 
growing in Ghana. SARI has released 3 varieties: SARCOT 1, 3 and 5.  
However, in spite of the attested quality of the SARI varieties, there does not seem to 
be any serious multiplication program in place. Low yields resulting from late delivery 
of inputs and poor seed is a major constraint to cotton cultivation. A combination of 
higher yields, sufficient producer incentives and improved marketing arrangements 
could certainly boost cotton production. 
 
Poor Producer Price 
 
Many farmers are deterred from growing cotton by low producer price. The producer 
price of seed cotton which stands at ¢3,000 has remained so for three years. This is 
not encouraging for farmers especially as cost of inputs has been increasing.  
 
Inadequate labour 
 
The cotton culture is labour intensive and especially more demanding during 
harvesting which is hand-picked and makes up about 60% of labour input. The 
weeding and thinning of cotton is equally demanding and account for about 30% of 
the total labour input. Table 6 shows the period that labour input is required and 
shows delays in almost all the activities involved in cotton production as well as 
overlapping of sowing and weeding of cotton and food crops especially in May and 
June. Picking of cotton also coincide with that of sorghum.  
 
Farmers depend mostly on family labour and when extra hands are needed there is 
inadequate supply. The competition for labour between cotton and food crops is 
certainly a constraint to the expansion of the cotton as farmers usually give priority to 
food crops. 
 
Inadequate education and extension services 
 
Farmers’ low literacy level and inadequate technical skills is widely acknowledged. 
Extension service on cotton production is left in the hands of cotton production 
assistants hired by the cotton companies. The CPAs have low educational level and 
are themselves hardly trained. Agricultural Extension Agents (AEAs) of MOFA who 
offer information on other crops are better trained and can give more technical 
information on cotton if a more collaborative role is defined. Both MOFA and cotton 
companies desire that this happen. 
 
3.4.1.3 Attitude of farmers 
 
Cotton companies accuse farmers of lack of commitment to cotton cultivation. 
However, farmers’ attitude to cotton cultivation seems to differ with location. Farmers 
closer to Tamale are associated with lower yield while those in more remote areas 
closer to the borders with Burkina Faso and Togo have higher yield. These are 
influenced by the more serious cotton production in the neighbouring countries while 
those closer to Tamale have more economic opportunities and market for food crops.  
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Cotton cultivation is also seen by some farmers as the “Company’s crop”. This 
attitude may underlie the apparent lack of commitment that such farmers exhibit. 
Serious effort is required in education and improvement of yield to change this 
attitude.  Farmers must want to make more money and improve their quality of life 
beyond the provision of basic household needs. 
 
Farmers are still producing cotton for several reasons some of which include the 
following: 
 
1. Most farmers do not consciously cost their labour, thus they perceive higher 
profits than indicated in the analysis. 
 
2. Many farmers cannot get money to purchase fertilizers for a very important 
crop such as maize and the only way out is to cultivate cotton and have 
access to fertilizer and other crops. 
 
3. It is also by producing cotton that most farmers have can have access to 
tractor services for the cotton and other crops. 
 
4. Cotton production affords farmers to get bulk money. This is particularly 
important to young people who want to buy assets such as bicycles, radios, 
furniture etc. 
 
5. If they do not produce cotton to sell for money, they will be forced to sell food 
crops at very low prices during the harvesting season. 
 
6. Farmers remember the not too far past when cotton production was very 
profitable and are hoping that cotton prices will improve in the future. 
 
The cultivation of seed cotton contributes to the cash security of farmers. Cash 
security level was assessed in a study conducted around Nyankpala, 20km west of 
Tamale in year 2000. Households were asked which amount they needed to satisfy 
their basic needs and their income and expenditure was registered for 12 months.  
 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that farmers’ economy is improved through the 
cultivation of cotton and will be enhanced even more when the farmer is encouraged 
to expand holdings in cotton and adopt practices that favour higher yields. 
 
3.4.2 Analysis of farmers’ organizations and relations with partners 
 
The use of farmer-based organizations has become a popular strategy for extension 
and especially for micro credit schemes where group solidarity and responsibility 
have worked to ensure better repayment rates. The success of this strategy rests on 
relative social cohesion. Northern Ghana abounds with various commodity groups. 
 
Cotton companies have also adopted the strategy of working with farmers as small 
producer groups within communities instead of individual farmers and to use group 
responsibility to retrieve debts of defaulting members. Farmers are asked to choose 
their own group members and many of them have chosen family members and close 
allies. Some farmers interviewed said they looked for people they could trust. They 
also select a chairman, secretary and treasurer. 
 
The sizes of these cotton producer groups (CPGs) vary from as small as three 
members to as many as fifty or more. One group in Bunglung headed by the chief 
was made up of 58 people.  These cotton producer groups at the community level are 
informal, unregistered and only seem to be loosely linked to Cotton Farmers 
 28
Association. The CPGs play active role in monitoring of input supplies. They perform 
the following functions: 
 
- Conduct initial screening of members for registration by cotton companies 
 
- Monitor cotton production activities of members 
 
- Receive farm inputs from companies for onward distribution to members 
 
- Record data on land preparation, farm inputs and seed cotton marketing for use 
by cotton production assistants 
 
- Contribute to pay any outstanding debts, should any member default. 
 
The cotton producer group relates to the cotton company through zonal officers and 
cotton production assistants (CPA) contracted by the cotton company to register 
farmers and groups, oversee input supply and application and offer general 
information on cotton.  
 
Deliberations with some executive members of the National Cotton Farmers’ 
Association (NCFA) revealed that the NCFA is a body formed in 2000 at the national 
level with the help of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and is represented at 
regional, zonal and district levels in the three northern regions. At each level, an 
Executive Committee made up of a core of Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and some 
trustees steer the affairs of the association. This body is also linked to the Apex 
Farmers’ Organisation of Ghana (APFOG) on which the Vice Chairman of the NCFA 
serves as the General Secretary. APFOG is an umbrella body of all farmer-based 
organizations in Ghana. 
 
Though the National Cotton Farmers Association seems to be well structured, it does 
not seem to be active as its meetings are adhoc and few. It is weak on the ground 
and needs to be strengthened and made more responsive to the needs of farmers. 
For instance, cotton farmers in one area whose farms got destroyed from the use of a 
particular insecticide supplied to them reported to the District Director of Agriculture 
but did not consider reporting to the association. 
 
Farmers and cotton companies alike confirm that the group strategy is good and has 
had a positive impact on loan recovery. The groups however, need to be developed 
further into stronger, self-supporting groups that can in future be able to source for 
their own funds and inputs. This will require reorganization of the groups to workable 
sizes, formalization and linkage to the national body through community level 
representation of the association. Expanding the structure to something like the figure 
below could be a good beginning.  
 
Groups need to be regularly trained to define their objectives, review their 
commitment, set targets and work towards achieving them.  
 
Though MOFA staff is well trained in group formation and dynamics, the cotton 
producer groups have not been trained and are not guided by any set principles. 
Issues such as how to deal with defaulting members and how to resolve conflicts 
have not been defined. This constitutes a big gap that should be filled.  
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Standing Committee on the Development of Cotton Industry in Ghana 
 
To help address the issue crippling the cotton industry and to move it forward, MOFA 
has set up the Standing Committee on the Development of the Cotton Industry in 
Ghana. The newly formed Standing Committee is to regulate and guide the cotton 
sector along the whole value chain, from production to the consumer. The specific 
terms of reference of the Standing Committee are to: 
 
- Look at and deal with complaints and grievances by stakeholders 
- Deal with request/applications for allocation of zones from new companies or 
existing ones using established criteria 
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- Come out with a code of ethics on operations, including sanctions against 
defaulters 
- Review environmental, social and economic factors to make the industry viable. 
- Look at any other issue which may facilitate the smooth development of the 
sector  
 
As part of its initial activities, the Standing Committee has identified and defined the 
roles of all stakeholders within the industry as presented in the table below. 
 
 
Stakeholders within the cotton industry and their roles 
Stakeholder Role 
Farmers/Farmer 
Groups 
 
- Primary producers of seed cotton 
- Producers of certified cotton seed (for planting) 
- Providers of land 
- Providers of traction equipment (in some cases) 
- Participate in price negotiation 
Cotton Companies 
 
- Facilitation of farmer identification, registration and group formation 
- Pre-finance production (negotiate for credit sources, input acquisition and 
distribution, land preparation) 
- Extension training and technical backstopping (supervision on the field 
etc.) 
- Co-ordination and monitoring field activities 
- Price negotiation 
- Field purchasing (seed cotton and cotton seed) and loan recovery 
- Produce evacuation from farm gate (transportation) 
- Ginning and classing/sorting 
- Identification of brokers 
- Marketing/Export 
Financial Institutions - Provision of credit 
Research 
 
- Seed development (breeder seeds and foundation seeds) 
- Agronomic practices 
- Provision of training (farmers, MOFA staff, cotton companies) 
- Undertake classing 
- Undertake socio-economic studies on impact of cotton production on farm 
families; environmental assessments/impacts of cotton production 
- Test efficacy of agro-chemicals 
MOFA 
 
- Extension and training 
- Certification of seeds 
- Policy development/ decisions 
- International trade negotiations (WTO etc.) 
- Facilitate price negotiations 
- Source/ initiate bilateral and multilateral agreement 
Development 
Partners 
- Facilitate and finance multi-stakeholder processes 
- Provision of technical backstopping / technical support 
- Advocacy role (e.g. Fair trade advocacy) 
Input Dealers 
 
- To ensure timely availability of essential inputs 
Textile Industries/ 
Brokers/Processors 
- Absorb all lint and commercial seed 
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The Standing Committee is also discussing the revision of the zoning strategy and 
defining what a cotton company should be. The following are some of the outcomes 
so far. 
 
The cotton company is defined by: 
 
1. The company’s legal status. The company must be legally registered and one 
of the operations should be cotton production. (The deed of incorporation 
should include cotton production, inputs and processing) 
2. Investments over the years: the company must have assets, ginnery and 
development programs 
3. The ability of companies to meet farmers’ basic input requirements in time for 
cotton production for at least 1000 units (500 ha). 
4. Evidence of financial capacity (letter of assurance from financier) 
5. Length of period of operation 
 
The potential of zones will also be determined by: 
- 1 000 farmers or more (interested in growing cotton) 
- Number of units in the base year of 2005 
- Acceptability of the company by farmers for existing companies (track 
record on companies performance) 
 
The committee will assess annually the target of each company, average yield, actual 
achievements, problems and reasons for variance.  
 
The Standing Committee could be developed into an inter-professional body where all 
stakeholders are represented.  
 
The table below summarizes the roles and functions undertaken by the main stakeholders 
in the cotton sector: 
 
 
Functions Farmers Cotton Cnies
Input 
suppliers ADB SARI
Tractor 
owners 
Transport 
Cnies 
Lint 
traders
Fixation seed cotton price X X       
Input supply  X X      
Financing of Input supply   X X X     
Land preparation X X       
Cotton production X     X   
Research and seed production  X       
Extension services  X   X    
Transport of seed cotton and lint  X     X  
Quality issues and lint classing  X       
Financing of Seed cotton purchase   X      X 
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3.4.3 Financial Institutions and micro-credit mechanisms 
 
Production of most smallholder cash crops in Sub-Saharan Africa requires use of 
some purchased inputs; seed, fertilizer or crop protection chemicals. General decline 
in input use has been attributed to: 
 
- High prices due to removal of subsidies following liberalization 
 
- Inadequate distribution networks in remote areas since cost of supplying small 
quantities to small farmers by private traders is prohibitive 
 
- Only a small minority of smallholder farmers retain sufficient savings to buy 
suitable quantities on inputs on a cash basis at the beginning of the growing 
season. The majority of farmers require credit if they are to be able to take 
advantage of the income earning opportunities offered by input use.  
 
Provision of seasonal credit to smallholders is fraught with difficulties. In many cases, 
private traders have been reluctant to get involved in supplying inputs where it may 
also mean providing credit in order to generate an attractive volume of business. 
 
Credit to buy inputs is therefore one of the most significant obstacle to smallholder 
cash crop production and in cotton cultivation where use of inputs is critical and 
expensive, access to credit for input supply is crucial. 
 
In Ghana the bulk of loans and advances from commercial banks have progressively 
gone to the Commerce and Finance sectors, followed by manufacturing and services. 
From 1991, loans and advances to the agricultural sector have declined consistently 
and apart from 2001, has performed worse since 1999. In average, the banks provide 
less 2% of their loans to the agricultural sector, and prefer to finance other sectors 
like trade, finance, services etc. 
 
Secondary banks have performed better in terms of loans and advances to the ctor 
although they also provide for services to the commerce and finance sectors and 
manufacturing. However, no secondary bank is at the moment involved in the 
financing of the cotton sector. 
 
Lending rates to the agricultural sector has not been significantly different from the 
Export or manufacturing sectors and have in fact been comparable from 2001 to 
2004. There are 116 Rural and Unit Banks and a number of non-bank financial 
institutions operating in rural and peri-urban settings. These are engaged in deposit 
mobilization and loan/advance delivery and are helping the agricultural sector 
 
Agricultural Development Bank 
 
ADB is the only financial institution that supports the cotton sector; by providing credit 
facilities for the cotton companies to enable them extend input credit to farmers. 
These operations have run into debts of about 130 billion Cedis. ADB has since 2000 
ceased to advance further loans to cotton companies except Ghana Cotton Company 
for which it has done a debt-equity swap and now owns about 78% shares in GCCL.  
ADB is looking for a strategic investor to take over GCCL but in the mean time it is 
company and is hopeful for recovery with better management and increased 
production.  
 
Since the adoption of input credit delivery to producer groups instead of individual 
farmers, cotton companies attest to improvement in loan recovery. This provides a 
good indication that a micro-credit scheme based on group solidarity and cohesion 
could work for cotton as for other crops.  
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A scheme whereby the Rural Banks manage a fund set up to support input 
acquisition for cotton production and disburses to registered farmer producer groups 
with guarantees from cotton companies who pay farmers through the bank could work 
and should be tried. This would free companies of debt burden and the bank would 
deduct the input credit before crediting the group’s account with their revenue.  
Discussions during the mission with Bonzali Rural bank in Tamale, the cotton 
companies and some farmers on the idea was favourable and therefore should be 
studied further and details worked out and tried.  
 
Such a scheme would however require stronger and more cohesive groups 
formalized through registration with the Department of Cooperatives.  
 
3.4.4 Recommendations 
 
The foregoing discussion has provided some highlights on developments in the cotton 
industry focusing more on issues at the farmer level. It is apparent that there are 
many areas that require urgent intervention to promote the industry. A few specific 
recommendations are summarized as follows: 
 
1. Farmers require a lot of education to value cotton production as potential 
major source of income. They must assume complete ownership of the 
operation and be empowered to increase production. This education can be 
done through their own associations and MOFA. The farmer groups need to 
be strengthened at all levels. Training on group formation, dynamics and 
development should be an integral part of building the capacity of the farmer 
associations. 
2. The Socio-economic unit of SARI could be empowered to carry out regular 
studies into farmers’ livelihoods, cultural and social factors that inform and 
influence their behaviour and attitudes as well as the economic implications of 
these.  
3. All stakeholders in the industry need to be guided by strong appreciation of 
their interrelated roles. Conflict in role definitions and expectations must be 
resolved to enhance performance. AFD could support the work of the 
Standing Committee or an inter-professional body to work towards role 
enhancement for the promotion of the entire sector. 
4. Inadequate input credit is crippling the industry. A revolving fund to support the 
timely provision of inputs for cultivation will improve yields as it will remove the 
delays in land preparation and planting. However, as an immediate step the 
government could facilitate a negotiated deal between ADB and the four 
cotton companies who are operational to be funded to provide input credit to 
more farmers. 
 
3.5 Farmers and farming systems in Northern Ghana 
 
There are unfortunately no statistics and very little studies about the cotton growers in 
Ghana, and there is little data about the farm households in general ; data about 
cotton production are not recorded by the RADUs and data per district related to 
cotton production are not available.   
It is therefore impossible or very difficult to analyse the characteristics of the cotton 
farms and to compare them with other farms. Food crops data is available at regional 
level and a comparison between district has been undertaken in Northern region 
(Tamale), in order to try to identify different kind of zones within the region. 
 
From the figures related to the kind of crops grown in the region for each district, it 
appears that this a big difference between the south and the north of the region if one 
compare the proportion od “tubercules” (mainly yam and casava). In some of the 
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districts, farmers grow more than 40% of the cultivated land in yam and casava, when 
those crops amount for less than 15% in others. 
 
The Annex 3 and graph below shows the proportion of yam + casava grown for each 
districts in 2004 (source : RADU Tamale annual report) : 
 
Proportion of "Yam + Cassava" per district of NR in 2004
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The Northern region is definitely very heteregeneous in terms of production system, 
and is has important consequences for cotton development. From experience and 
observations, it appears that cotton are less attractive for farmers when they have 
alternative cash crops, which is the case in zones where the soils and climatic 
conditions are suitable for yam and casava. This is the situation in the south of the 
Northern region, where cotton has never been really able to develop and where there 
has always been the most important problems of bad repayments of loans for inputs. 
In this kind of zone, animal traction is also almost inexistant and farmers rely entirely 
on cotton companies for land preparation. This kind of zone consequently shows the 
lowest yields, as shown in the graph below, where are compared the seed-cotton 
yields of the three divisions of GCCL, the Central division covering the centre and 
south of the Northern region : 
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Comparison of Seedcotton yields within GCCL Divisions since 
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In terms of systems of production, the biggest potential for cotton development lies 
more in Upper East, Upper West and the northern part of Northern region.  
The importance of cotton in the north of Ghana can be assessed through the 
proportion of cotton growers among the total number of farmers ; the cotton 
companies provide data about the number of cotton growers, but there are no data 
about the total number of farm households. It can however be estimated through the 
rural population and the number of active population involved in agriculture activities, 
both information being available in the population census (Year 2000).  
From the census, it appears that a population of about 1.2 million can be considered 
as active in the agriculture sector ; if we consider that the average size of a farm is 
about 6 active, the total number of farm households in the three Ghana northern 
regions is about 200 000. The average number of farmers having grown cotton during 
the last 5 years amounts for about 33 000, i.e. 16.5% of the total number of farmers. 
The cotton production is therefore not a major crop for the three regions, although 
there are probably major discripancies between regions and districts. For instance, it 
is likely that cotton is much more important in Upper East than in the south of 
Northern region.   
 
3.6 Seed cotton production issues 
 
3.6.1 Agricultural research and extension 
 
3.6.1.1 Agricultural research 
 
The Savanna Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) at Tamale conducts research into 
all aspects of cotton production. Also at Tamale, the University for Development 
Studies (UDS) conducts socio-economics research, notably in relation to cotton 
production. The University of Ghana (Soil Science Department and Department of 
Geography and Development studies) at Legon, the Environmental Protection 
Agency at Accra, the Soil Research Institute (Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research) at Kumasi and the University of Science and Technology (Department of 
Crop Science), also at Kumasi, contribute through studies to an improved 
understanding of the cotton region’s environment or conduct experiments for soil 
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conservation or into innovative cropping systems (direct sowing). Only SARI and UDS 
were visited by the mission. 
 
The SARI centre is located at Nyankpala, 20 km west of Tamale. It has about 1000 
ha of land and testing stations are distributed over all the agro-ecological zones of the 
three northern regions: Manga, Damogo, Yendi, Salaga and Wa. About 35 scientists 
and a hundred technicians are involved in the different plant programmes. The overall 
goal of SARI is to put a system in place to respond to the needs of the farmers and to 
increase their production and incomes. SARI coordinates the activities of the 
Research-Extension Linkage Committees in the northern regions. 
 
The cotton programme has had up 10 scientists working at different times in the fields 
of genetics, agriculture, entomology and socio-economics. During our visit, only two 
scientists were present, including the geneticist (Dr Marshark S. Adbulai) who 
received us. Two scientists are undergoing long-term training in the United Kingdom 
(one geneticist and one entomologist). The second entomologist of the programme 
was named Director of SARI. Finally, four scientists resigned – two agrologists and 
two socio-economists – to join other institutes. There is thus a real human resources 
problem and the continuity of the programme, as well as the scientists’ motivation, 
remains a matter of concern. 
 
Within this context, only the programme for varietal selection has displayed a certain 
continuity and has arrived at a few tangible results. The varietal problem is acute in 
Ghana and the programme is therefore very relevant. It consisted of:  
 
- the creation of a collection of genotypes of diverse provenances; 
- the evaluation of these varieties in Ghanaian conditions;  
- comparative studies in actual conditions of some varieties from this collection, 
selected for their results. 
 
Research was conducted on three varieties of the collection, renamed SARCOT 1, 
SARCOT 5 and SARCOT 9 and tested in a multi-location network from 2000 to 2003. 
Some results were astonishing, for example, SARCOT 5 which was longer and with a 
best strenght than the FK 290 variety. 
The multiplication of these varieties can be continued, while verifying these results, 
notably from the perspective of their technological properties. 
 
No result was shown or communicated to us in other domains of cotton research. 
 
3.6.1.2 Agricultural extension 
 
In principle, agricultural extension is the responsibility of MOFA in each cotton-
growing region. But given that cotton is not the most widespread crop, there are no 
specific extension programmes for it. Overall, there is about one development agent 
for every 1500 cotton farms. 
 
As in the cotton-producing systems of neighbouring countries, it is the cotton 
companies that provide cultivation assistance, with a development agent to grower 
ratio better than that of MOFA: one agent for 500 growers. Essentially, these agents 
enumerate grower groups and take care of input needs. An extension effort was 
launched for phytosanitary control which is now conducted by the growers themselves 
under the agents’ supervision. 
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3.6.2 Agronomic issues 
 
3.6.2.1 Seed cotton yield 
 
Figure 1 shows the changes in national mean yields for Ghana and neighbouring 
countries. The yields in Ghana are lower than those in Benin, and even those in 
Burkina Faso, where the pluviometry is less favourable. These gaps are not 
not very reliable because the actual area under cultivation is not easy to assess; the 
inputs distributed for cotton cultivation can be and are often used for other agricultural 
purposes. 
narrowing. However, one must note that the figures for the national mean yields are 
 
.6.2.2 Parcel visits 
els were visited in the vicinity of Tamale with the Ghana Cotton Company, 
 
The first technical constraint that became apparent was the sowing date, often late. 
his late sowing is due to motorised tilling, itself delayed because of an inadequate 
and antiquated tractor fleet. The farmers are conscious of this: they cite the delay in 
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Figure 1: Comparison of changes in seed cotton yields 
3
                            
Cotton parc
in the village of Ando Nyamanu, close to the Togolese border, with Nulux and in the 
vicinity of Wa with the Plantation Development Company.  
Some parcels visited seemed to have been sown quite early, end-May or beginning-
June, and were at the stage of the formation of the first capsules. These parcels thus 
presented good production potential. Taking into account the period of the visit (mid-
August, i.e., about 80 days after the start of the rainy season), this was a stage of 
development that should have been widespread. But most cotton parcels were at a 
less advanced stage. Some parcels were even observed to be at the four-leaf stage, 
whose sowing must have taken place at the end of July. It is known that the 
production loss is, on the average, 15 kg of seed cotton for every day of sowing delay 
beyond the optimal date, which we can fix at mid-June for the regions of the extreme 
north (Upper West and Upper East Region) and end-June for the Northern Region. 
 
T
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tractor tilling as one of the reasons affecting production. The farmers of the Ando 
Nyamanu village even mentioned that when they were sowing their crops, those in 
Burkina Faso were already in place, even though the pluviometry there is less 
favourable. 
 
Another problem created by motorised tilling is that of soil erosion. Almost 
verywhere in the fields ravines are created and soil stripping is visible. On old 
 
 of tilling will be taken up later in the specific topics. 
 
ry control. Numerous 
ttacks on blossom buds and flowers were observed. On the average, one plant in 
 conscious of this and blame the distribution of outdated or 
effective supplies as a production constraint. In fact, a farmer showed us a bottle of 
s that these two constraints are the most 
ignificant. We also noticed plant density, often too sparse; we sometimes observed 
 
 
e
parcels and those frequently worked on by tractors, problems of cotton rooting due to 
an iron pan arise. On the stripped areas, we can observe that emergences are poor 
or nonexistent. Nevertheless, the farmers never cite soil fertility as a production 
constraint. 
The problem
The second production constraint in the field is poor phytosanita
a
five displayed holey floral organs or shedding, probably of phytosanitary origin. Leaf 
damage was also present. Earias spp and Helicoverpa armigera caterpillars were 
frequently observed. 
 
The farmers are also
in
Polythrin C whose expiration date was well past. Still, it would have been difficult to 
find out this bottle’s origin. In the market of the same village, insecticide products for 
cotton were freely available. There are almost as many phytosanitary treatment 
programmes as there are cotton companies in the region, which, in such a small area, 
is not justifiable. Some programmes consisting of five applications with the same 
product (mixture of cypermethrin and profenofos) are unsuitable for the infesting 
parasitic facies, mainly because of the resistance that Helicoverpa armigera is 
developing in western Africa against pyrethrinoids and cypermethrin, in particular. 
The GCC recommends a programme that is more suitable, including two initial 
treatments with endosulfan to limit the population of resistant caterpillars, as is now 
practiced in all neighbouring countries. 
 
After our visits, it became clear to u
s
that there had been several re-sowings. But poor emergences are common in areas 
where erosion is severe, so much so that the quality of seeds cannot be the only 
cause. 
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We noted that the parcels we visited were well maintained, in particular with good 
thinning and weeding. Some foliar symptoms of mineral deficiency were observed, 
mainly concerning nitrogen. 
 
3.6.2.3 Quality of seed cotton 
 
The quality of the harvested seed cotton influences greatly the quality of the fibre 
obtained after milling. And, obviously, the seed cotton quality depends to a great 
extent on the cultivated variety. But cultivation techniques and the care taken during 
harvesting have also significant impact on the quality of the final product. The 
mission’s period was such that we could not observe harvesting operations, nor the 
presence or absence of cotton whitefly or aphids at the end of the cycle. The latter 
can lead to sticky cotton or mould development. We learnt of the harvesting 
procedures commonly used, not very conducive to preserving quality, but were 
unable to observe how widespread these procedures are. However, late sowing and 
inadequate phytosanitary control remain the major cultural reasons that can impact 
seed cotton quality. 
 
3.6.2.4 Conclusions 
 
Based on our field visits, we consider that two major agricultural constraints limit 
yields: late sowing and inadequate sanitary control. Each of these two factors can 
explain yields lower than those in neighbouring countries. We also noted planting 
density that is not uniform with missing plants or re-sown ones, attributable either to 
crop seed quality or to soil erosion problems. These constraints can be easily 
overcome with suitable technical support. 
  
3.6.2.5 Recommendations 
 
 1) Test and implement alternatives to motorised tilling. 
 2) Harmonise the different recommendations for the applications of phytosanitary 
     control and verify their effectiveness. 
 3) Implement a system for cotton seed multiplication. 
 
3.6.3 Specific technical issues 
 
3.6.3.1 Alternatives to motorised tilling 
 
The harmful consequences of these cultivation methods have been mentioned. The 
quasi-systematic recourse to motorised tilling, most often using tractors from cotton 
company fleets or private tractors, has led to little development in the use of animal 
draught farming in Ghana as compared to neighbouring countries. Moreover, until 
recently, the area under cotton cultivation in Ghana was small and its low profitability 
did not permit growers to invest in animal teams to any large extent. Finally, the prices 
set for tractor tilling are low: 180,000 cedis per unit (0.5 ha), i.e., approximately 
10,000 FCFA, which is equivalent to the price of tilling using animal power in 
Cameroon. This does not encourage the producers to equip themselves with animals. 
This price cannot cover all the expenses of running a tractor, and most certainly not 
its depreciation; the tractor fleets simply cannot be renewed and soon fall into 
disrepair, thus limiting the expansion possibilities of the area under cotton cultivation. 
Sowing is susceptible to ever increasing delays, compromising yields. It is in such a 
context that alternatives to motorised tilling should urgently be implemented. 
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 Distribution of animal draught power 
 
Animal draught power is an alternative that has proven itself in neighbouring 
countries. 
 
 Availability of animals and implements 
 
In Tamale, there is a company that sells implements for use with bovine or asinine 
draught power. According to a census by MOFA Northern Region, the cattle 
husbandry is sufficiently developed to supply adequate numbers of draught animals. 
 
 Profitability of animal draught power at the grower level 
 
Most often, studies into the profitability of animal draught power compare economic 
results between manual cultivation and animal-assisted cultivation. Hesse and 
Runge-Metzger (1999) conducted such a comparison in North Ghana and could not 
arrive at a conclusion that animal-assisted farming is more profitable. But, in our view, 
these studies are difficult to conduct because of the amount of data that has to be 
acquired (family size, cultivated area, total production obtained, etc.) and, often, the 
number of sample farms monitored is too small to fully represent the wide prevailing 
heterogeneity of these quantities, and basing comparisons thereon is unreliable.  
Another method, much simpler, consists of calculating the time it will take for an 
animal team to pay for itself by tilling. This is closer to reality in conditions prevailing in 
Ghana, because irrespective of whether the animal team works on the farm or 
elsewhere, the savings in cost are those of tractor tilling, costs that are clearly 
defined. Moreover, cattle draught tilling is identical, even more, that the cost of 
motorised tilling. A pair of oxen costs 5 million cedis and a plough a little less than 1 
million at the Tamale company. An animal team can easily till 5 hectares per year. 
Thus, in four years, the animal team pays for itself. 
 
The difficulty lies more in the financing of the purchase of the animal team rather than 
on its payback period. Another problem is the risk of theft of draught animals, which is 
fairly common as we learnt, and the risk of mortality of the animals. If not eliminating 
them altogether, the adoption of animal-marking techniques and improved health care 
can at least reduce these risks. As to medium-term credit, while it is desirable and 
envisageable for the implements, it has been a total failure wherever tried for 
financing the purchase of draught animals, mainly due to the difficulty of recovering 
annual instalments. 
 
Asinine draught power is less expensive than bovine draught power and can be 
considered as an interesting alternative for those farmers who cannot purchase 
draught oxen. An ass costs less than one million, i.e., one fifth that of a pair of oxen. 
However, while cattle have value at the end of their careers, the ass has none. The 
profitability of asinine draught power is better than that of bovine draught power: an 
asinine team can work 2 to 3 hectares per year and can be purchased for about one-
third the cost of a bovine team. 
 
Replacing tilling by the use of herbicides 
 
In North Cameroon, the technique of direct sowing with the use of herbicides has 
developed mainly in a context of a shortage of draught teams. This technique’s 
advantage is that cotton or maize can be sown early without waiting for the availability 
of a draught team and thus retain the potential of full production. It requires no 
investments and consists of eliminating weeds by spreading a total herbicide 
(glyphosate) and to sow without tilling the soil. The dose is of 3 to 4 litres of Rundup 
(360g/l of glyphosate) per hectare depending on the amount and species of weeds 
present. In Cameroon in 2006, a litre of Rundup was sold to farmers at 1600 FCFA, 
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i.e., 30,000 cedis. We can complement this treatment with herbicides specific to the 
damage: Diuron on cotton or Atrazine on maize. Commelina presence necessitates 
the use of Atrazine on maize preceding cotton. 
 
Direct sowing under cover 
 
The use of direct sowing under cover methods (DCM: Direct sowing, mulch-based 
systems and conservation agriculture) are spreading in the northern Cameroon and 
southern Mali. These methods consist of not tilling the soil and letting it remain 
covered permanently by mulch or live plants. The lack of mechanical soil tilling is 
compensated for by the reactivation of the biological life which improves the soil’s 
physical fertility. The advantages of these systems are reduced working time, 
improved soil fertility due to reduced erosion and an increase in the chemical, 
physical and biological fertility of the soils. However, a certain level of expertise is 
required to control weeds and parasites, and to ensure an adequate nitrogen supply 
to the crop. Their use requires a significant investment in adaptive research and 
especially in extension activities.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Alternative technical solutions to motorized tilling exist and have been proven to work 
in similar conditions in neighbouring countries. They have to be demonstrated and 
encouraged, their dissemination organised and facilitated (seasonal financing for 
herbicides, medium-term credit for draught-animal equipment and implements, 
organisation and dissemination of veterinary information and care and of techniques 
of marking oxen). It will also help if the price of motorised tilling approaches its true 
cost at the same time as the alternatives proposed here are implemented, to make 
the latter more attractive. 
  
3.6.3.2 Phytosanitary issues 
 
As far as phytosanitary control is concerned, recommendations should be harmonised 
and should take into account sub-regional recommendations for treatments for limiting 
the resistance of Helicoverpa armigera to pyrothrinoids (respecting the two usage 
windows in association with products with endosulfan to limit the resistant 
populations). 
 
Tests of the three levels of phytosanitary protection (no protection, recommended 
protection and maximum protection) can be used to measure the efficiency of the 
extension programme and constitute the minimum monitoring necessary for their 
evaluation and possible adaptation. They are not very complicated to implement and, 
if not done as part of research activities, can be implemented directly in a 
research/development framework. 
 
3.6.3.3 Varietal and seed issues 
 
There are two goals as far as seed production is concerned: the distribution of an 
adapted high-yield variety that gives good quality fibre and the supply of quality seed 
with good emergence, thus leading to good crop density in the field. Currently, Ghana 
has not established its own system of seed multiplication. Seeds of the Burkina Faso 
variety are regularly purchased and introduced in Ghana. Ghanaian research offers 
varieties which, even though they may have been imported, can, depending on their 
evaluation, form the basis of a national multiplication scheme. Unfortunately, this 
research project was interrupted this season because of the lack of ability to gin the 
three tonnes of seed cotton that resulted from multiplication tests of the three varieties 
offered for agricultural pre-extension. This small amount was intended to be ginned 
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on the 20-saw mini-gin which the cotton research project owns (some twenty hours of 
ginning). It is, admittedly, difficult to gin such small quantities of seed cotton in a mill.  
 
The establishment of a seed multiplication programme at the national level will allow: 
- saving of the substantial expense of importing seeds; 
- better control over the quality of seeds supplied to growers; 
- elimination of the phytosanitary risk associated with imported seeds; 
- better control over the varietal choice.  
 
Recommendations for the establishment of a seed multiplication programme were 
made during an earlier mission (Dessauw and Mennozi, 2000). 
 
As far the possibility of introducing genetically modified varieties of cotton is 
concerned, the recent experience in South Africa, India and China show that this 
technology is not profitable in case of low-intensity cultivation. Moreover, the 
introduction of GMOs in Ghana is not recommended in the current production 
conditions. The establishment of a seed multiplication programme would also avoid 
supply problems for traditional varieties that would arise if Burkina Faso were to shift 
to a GM variety of cotton. 
  
3.6.3.4 Conclusions 
 
Mean yields in cotton cultivation in Ghana are lower than those in neighbouring 
countries because of the technical problems identified here and for which solutions 
can be tested. The persistence of these problems calls out for the establishment of a 
research and development approach, a topic which we will expand upon in the 
recommendations. 
 
3.6.4 Economic issues 
 
3.6.4.1 Prices of different agro-outputs and -inputs 
 
The role of the States in fixing agricultural prices has continuously diminished and 
market forces or inter-party negotiations now largely determine prices. The State no 
longer fixes the prices of food crops and intervenes in the market to reduce variations 
in prices only to build up security stocks. Nevertheless, the volume of national imports 
of cereals that the State controls can and does still impact food crop prices. The seed 
cotton price is fixed every year in most countries within the trade, in principle 
independent of State intervention. But often, especially when negotiations fail, the 
State fixes the price as a last resort. So even though the State does not directly 
decide agricultural prices, it retains several ways of influencing them. 
 
The prices that growers get for their produce constitutes the determining factor of their 
income, and impacts the way they view different possible crops (in terms of cultivated 
area and the intensification of applied techniques). The low price paid to seed cotton 
producers in Ghana has often been mentioned as the source of their disinterest in 
cotton as a crop, in contrast to their neighbours in the CFA zone. It is thus necessary 
to see how this price has changed over time, in comparison to food crop prices and to 
those obtainable in neighbouring countries.  
 
Problems due to lack of knowledge of prices paid to producers 
 
While the seed cotton price is fixed annually at the national level, the food crop prices 
are not. These vary widely from one market to another in the same country and within 
the same year. To be able to make comparisons over the years and for different 
countries, we have to arrive at a mean price for each crop. Unlike for seed cotton, this 
price will however obviously not be representative of all the transactions that took 
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place in the year for all the producers. In addition, prices paid to producers differ from 
those charged from consumers; they can vary up to a factor of two for retail and 
wholesale (Brüntrup, 1997). Price data is often presented in papers and reports 
without a clear mention of how the prices cited were arrived at, thus rendering them 
difficult to use. It was not possible for us during the mission to obtain directly the 
prices of the main food crops over the past few seasons. Data from FAO5 of the 
prices paid to producers has been used here. 
 
Prices paid for seed cotton to the producers may seem at first easier to acquire. 
However, generally there exist two or three purchase prices based on the quality of 
the seed cotton being purchased. Some seed cotton price data was obtained by the 
equalization of seed cotton prices depending on the tonnages purchased of the 
different categories (Goreux and Macrae, 2003), which can explain some price 
differences between different sources. To conduct a meaningful comparison between 
countries, we will refer here to the purchase price of the first choice seed cotton since 
most cotton purchased is of this quality and corresponds to quality obtained by normal 
cultivation practices. A second difficulty arises from the fact that in certain countries, 
such as Benin and Burkina Faso, the initial price of the seed cotton can be increased 
at the end of the season by a premium depending on the financial performance of the 
system subsector. We will take into account this possible price premium, which not all 
sources do. Finally, the cotton prices in Benin in the last few years have been 
somewhat unusual, with several price announcements during the season, often late, 
depending on the cotton fibre prices obtained by the ginners. 
 
Knowing the prices of inputs is also difficult because cotton growers generally obtain 
their inputs from the mills at prices different from retail prices elsewhere. Depending 
on the source, the price of inputs includes, without sometimes indicating it, the cost of 
seasonal credit extended, often representing 10% or more of the price. Data here 
includes this cost. 
 
Comparisons of prices between countries require the use of mean exchange rates 
between different national currencies, which can skew calculations, especially in 
cases of major currency fluctuations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 FAOSTAT database available on the Internet at http://faostat.fao.org/site/570/default.aspx 
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Comparison of changes in producer prices for seed cotton in Ghana and 
neighbouring countries 
 
Changes in the seed cotton purchase price in Ghana, Burkina Faso and Benin from 
1984 to 2006 are shown in Figure 2. The purchase price in Burkina Faso and Benin 
track each other for the most part, with the price in Benin being slightly higher – which 
makes sense since it is a coastal country and with lower transport costs, cotton mills 
can pay its growers a little more. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of changes in producer prices for first choice seed cotton. 
 
In contrast, the seed cotton purchase price in Ghana was lower than those in Benin or 
Burkina Faso from 1999 to 2003 and very much lower during the 1988–1995 period. It 
was only in 1998 and during the last two seasons that the purchase prices in all three 
countries were more or less the same. The comparison during the 1988–1995 period 
is skewed because inputs were subsidized in Ghana and the seed cotton purchase 
price took that into account. On the other hand, the comparison for 1998–2005 makes 
sense, the cost of inputs being more or less the same in all three countries. It should 
be noted that the closing together of the seed cotton prices in the last two seasons in 
these countries is due to a drop in producer prices in the countries of the CFA zone 
and an increase in Ghana. The drop in prices in the countries of the CFA zone is due 
to a marked fall in world prices for cotton fibre; industries cannot pay growers the 
same prices as earlier without endangering the entire cotton production system. This 
fall has taken place in a context where the power of producers in negotiating prices is 
considerable. The cotton industry in Ghana is also confronted with the same problems 
regarding the fall in prices of cotton fibre, and we cannot foresee the prices paid to 
producers, similar to those in the neighbouring countries, increasing without a 
substantial increase in cotton fibre prices without endangering the entire cotton 
producing industry. 
 
As evidence, 3 shows the change in the proportion of the seed cotton purchase price 
as a percentage of the cotton fibre sale price. This ratio shows the contribution of the 
grower in the cotton industry’s finished product. 
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Figure 3: Changes compared in the ratio seed cotton purchase price/cotton fibre sale price (on the 
basis of  a ginning yield of 40%). 
 
The 2004 levels, with between 70% and 80% of the sale price of the cotton fibre 
going to the seed cotton grower is unsustainable over the long term and, if 
maintained, would endanger the entire cotton production system. Unless the cotton 
fibre prices rise, it is difficult to envisage an increase in the purchase price of seed 
cotton. In 2005, the ratios for the three countries were very similar. The Ghanaian 
ginning and cotton fibre industries are not more efficient than their counterparts in 
Benin or Burkina Faso and we can conclude that the seed cotton growers in Ghana 
were paid a price equivalent to that paid in the CFA zone. This was not the case 
earlier, notably in the 1998–2003 period (before 1995, the same remark applies, since 
the low ratio in 3 for Ghana does not take into account input subsidies). 
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 Figure 4: Changes in prices paid to growers of the main food crops 
(FAOSTAT data)  
 
 
Comparison of changes in producer prices for food crops in Ghana and neighbouring 
countries 
 
The only data we have is from the FAOSTAT database, which may contain some 
inaccuracies. Moreover, the mean annual price in a country for a food crop is not as 
representative as it is for seed cotton because the purchase price for food crops can 
vary substantially in the same country from one market to the next and in the same 
year. Whereas the cotton markets are generally organized within producing villages or 
in nearby ones, this is not so for food crops. And the proximity of the market where 
the grower will be able to sell his produce constitutes yet another factor for price 
differentiation. 
 
Figure 4 shows the change in purchase prices paid to producers of the main food 
crops from 1991 to 2003. We can see that apart for cassava, the prices paid to 
growers in Ghana are generally higher than those in neighbouring countries, or at 
worst are more or less the same. Also, it can be seen that on the whole, towards the 
end of the period, the different curves approach each other, indicating the closing 
together of food crop prices in the countries of the sub-region. We can see here the 
effect of the reduction of State intervention in the fixing of prices which tend now to be 
regulated by the marketplace. These prices will be used in the following sections of 
this report. 
 
 Comparison of changes in the sale price of agricultural inputs 
 
This is shown in Figure 5. Compound fertilizer in Ghana differs from that in other 
countries: in Ghana, it follows the 15-15-15 formula, whereas in the other countries 
the formula additionally includes sulphur and boron. Nevertheless, we can see that 
the three curves have tended to go up over the period. Prices in Benin are generally 
lower than those in Burkina Faso, which is logical if we consider the different 
transportation costs. The price of NPK fertilizer in Ghana has, on the whole, been 
lower than in the other countries but the curves have tended to approach each other, 
with more or less equivalent prices in 2006. 
 
It is also possible to compare the changes in the total cost of recommended inputs 
per hectare of cotton cultivation (Figure 6). The recommendations differ in the three 
countries: type of compound fertilizer, type of additional nitrogen input (ammonium 
sulphate in Ghana, urea in the two other countries), treatment programmes and 
insecticide products. To not skew too much the data, we have not taken into account 
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the cost of tilling in the total for Ghana since this expenditure is not applicable to the 
other two countries. 
 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of the changes in the price of compound fertilizer in Ghana and 
neighbouring countries. 
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Figure 6:  Comparison of total inputs costs. 
 
 
 
 
The total input costs per hectare are comparable in Benin and Ghana for the last six 
years. 
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 Figure 7: Comparison of the seed cotton quantity necessary to pay for the inputs. 
 
Figure 7 shows the changes over the years in the quantity of seed cotton necessary 
per hectare to pay for the cost of the inputs. This quantity was higher in the past for 
Ghana, but has become comparable to that for Benin in 2006. In 2006, a grower in 
Ghana must produce 550 kg/ha to cover the input costs, without including the cost of 
tractor tilling, and 670 kg/ha when including it. In these conditions, only good yields 
obtained by intensive farming techniques will lead to profits from this crop. 
 
 
 Impact of the seed cotton purchase price  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the correlation between the purchase price paid to seed cotton 
growers and the national cotton production. The latter curve is somewhat offset from 
the first; this represents the reaction time between the seed cotton purchase price 
and the production.  
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Figure 8: Changes in seed cotton production and seed cotton producer prices in Ghana. 
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 Conclusions 
Economic conditions for cotton production have long been less favourable in Ghana 
than in neighbouring countries. Very recently, however, these conditions have 
become comparable due to an improvement in Ghana and a worsening in the 
neighbouring countries. As far as food crops are concerned, the economic conditions 
are either the same or better in Ghana than in neighbouring countries. In this context, 
it is not surprising that Ghanaian national cotton production depends on the seed 
cotton price fixed for purchases from growers. Nevertheless, the price reached in 
2006 cannot increase without endangering the entire cotton production system unless 
there is a sustained and significant increase in the price of cotton fibre. The fall in 
easons 
 
Nor is the seed cotton purchase price the only factor in the growers’ reluctance to 
r meetings with farmers and groups of growers, delayed 
payment for the seed cotton (up to eight months in some cases) was almost always 
 
 
 
seed cotton purchase prices in neighbouring countries in the last few s
occurred in spite of the growers’ clout during price negotiations, and confirms the 
observation that no increases are likely with cotton fibre prices prevailing at 2006 
levels. 
plant cotton. During ou
cited as a cause for their lack of interest in cotton cultivation. 
Recommendations 
1.) Avoid any excessive change in the seed cotton purchase price. This can be done 
by absorbing over several years the rises and falls caused by changes in 
exchange rates or by changes in the prices of cotton fibre and inputs. Frequent 
changes inject an element of economic uncertainty and tend to scare away new 
farmers from the cotton crop. 
2.) Pay growers on time. Late payments tend to negate any positive effects that a 
favourable price climate may create for the growers. 
Compar
 
 
3.6.4.2 ison of the productivities of different crops 
second intensive. The 
calculations are detailed in the appendices. The labour component was drawn from 
in particular Brüntrup (1997), Crétenet (1983) and Faure (1990), 
whose data was extracted from farm monitoring programmes. The yields of the 
Min
 
Tab
the possible to estimate and compare the land and the 
pro  by the sale of the produce 
less the cost of agricultural inputs. In Ghana, the cost of motorized tilling of the soils 
tuber crops) since this practice is 
widespread there. In Burkina Faso, the calculations included the cost of draught-
 
The prices of agricultural produce allow us to calculate the profitabilities of different 
crops that exist in the region and to compare them. Towards this end, the 2001 and 
2006 seasons were selected for Ghana and Burkina Faso, with each season 
consisting of two crop cycles, the first traditional, the 
several references, 
different crops for the two crop cycles were obtained from a French Cooperation 
istry report (1987).  
les showing the different calculations and explaining their basis are included in 
 appendices. Using them, it is 
labour productivities of the different crops (see Figure 10 and Figure 9). The land 
ductivity is defined as the earned income per hectare
has been included in the input cost (except for 
animal tilling of the soil. Labour productivity is the preceding result divided by the 
quantity of man-days necessary for the entire growing cycle. In the context of land-
supply pressures where the amount of land is the limiting factor for production, it is 
the land productivity that has to be maximised. In an environment where labour is the 
limiting factor, labour productivity has to be increased. It this latter factor that 
predominates in Ghana as well as in Burkina Faso. 
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The land productivity is high for tubers, especially in intensive farming. Yields of more 
than 8 T/ha are common. But, generally, farms only devote small plots for tubers 
since labour requirements are high for these crops. Amongst non-tuber crops, land 
productivity is the maximum for cotton or groundnuts, followed by maize and 
sorghum, in that order. This conforms with others’ findings (Guibert et al., 2002). This 
was not however the case in Ghana in 2001, irrespective of the cropping technique, 
because of the low remuneration received by cotton growers. It only became so for 
Ghana in 2006 with intensive farming. 
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Figure 10: Comparison of land productivities for different crops. 
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Figure 9: Comparisons of labour productivities for different crops. 
As far as labour productivity is concerned, tuber crops have productivities similar to 
those of other crops because of the substantial amount of labour required for crop 
management. The labour productivity for the cotton crop is, in most cases, the lowest 
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amongst all the crops considered here; the differences with food crops were large in 
Ghana in 2001 but less so for intensive cotton farming as compared to cereal crops. 
In 2006, in both countries, only one intensive cotton crop shows a labour productivity 
that isn’t much lower than of the food crops. 
 
These results suggest that the growers who plant cotton do not do so because of its 
labour productivity, since it does have the best labour productivity. The seed cotton 
price fixed in advance, the possibility of obtaining seasonal credit, one-time payment 
for the harvest and the organisation of cotton markets near growing areas are also 
inducing factors. 
 
But, however, if the cotton crop’s productivity becomes too low as compared to food 
crops, there will be a drop in the number of farmers who will grow cotton. This was the 
case in Ghana in 2001 and is becoming so in 2006 for traditional cultivation. 
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Ghana
To compare changes in crop productivities between 2001 and 2006, we must work in 
constant local currencies, as shown in Figure 11. We can observe a significant 
lowering of productivity for almost all crops, except cotton in Ghana. Food crops in 
Ghana lost a lot of their productivities in constant cedis between 2001 and 2006 
because of the high inflation rate in the country. 
Conclusions
 
 
Productivities, and thus the incomes in constant cedis and FCFA, have currently 
decreased substantially for Ghanaian and Burkinabe growers. Only the productivity of 
cotton cultivation increased in Ghana betwee
 
n 2001 and 2006. Intensive farming 
 increasing agricultural incomes. Cotton cultivation has been 
rce of this intensification in the countries of the CFA zone. Developing 
 
3.6.4.3 
 
ld not find data from any recent or broader 
surveys of cultivation systems in northern Ghana. 
) arrives at 
similar results for surveys conducted in 1982/83 in the Nort
residents for manual farming and 14.5 for draught- l farm
under cultivation per resident is a little lower in Gh ) than er 
anin (op. cit) finds 35 and 44 ares re
aught-animal farming. Tractor tillin
es not allow an increa cultiva area. Draught-ani
ead in Ghana. 
der cotton is lower in Gh The yields income are lowe
ust note that 2005 was a bad year in Ghana and 2004 a good o
e told that some farms in Ghana had a cotton income that was tw
 2004 than in 2005. 
X1000 con
Profitability per day of work
remains the only way of
the driving fo
this crop and intensifying farming for the other crops is a means of increasing 
incomes of farmers in northern Ghana. 
Comparison of cultivation systems 
During field visits, 8 farms were surveyed for cultivated areas and sales performance. 
This data can be compared to surveys conducted in Burkina Faso and Benin (see 
Table 1). During the mission, we cou
 
The farms are of similar sizes: 11 or 12 residents per farm. Panin (1988
hern Region: 10.8 
ing. The total area 
 th
anima
ana (41 ares it is in the o
spectively of two countries (over 50 ares). P
cultivated area per resident for manual and dr g, 
common in Ghana, do
espr
se in this ted mal 
farming is not wid
 
age unThe acre ana. and r in 
Ghana, but one m
r
ne 
in Benin. We we
or three times greater in
o 
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Figure 11: Compared productivities for 2001 and 2006 in constant local currencies for the main 
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Data acquired in Ghana is too skewed to sed for rel conclusions. We can 
hat the size of the Ghanaian farms and those of neighbouring 
in the number esidents an  the cultivated area. 
mic results will be mainly due to the cultivation system, the yields 
 agricultural produce. Such data, if it had been acquired over 
representative samples, would allow for real comparisons, closer to reality than the 
economic calculations of the previous section. 
.6.4.4 Conclusions 
The development of cotton cultivation as a means of intensifying cultivation systems 
ditions for the satisfactory 
development of this crop are now applied to Ghana, in a context where the income of 
 
 
Eastern provinces of 
 (year 2004) 
 be u iable 
nevertheless posit t
countries are similar, both  of r d in
Differences in econo
obtained and the price of
 
3
 
in Ghana is a possible way of reducing poverty there, despite the unfavourable 
economic context of low cotton fibre prices. Economic con
African growers is on the low side. There is very little leeway for increasing prices 
paid to growers and we will have to rely on promoting techniques for increasing and 
sustaining yields and farming income. 
Table 1: Comparison of cultivation systems in Ghana and neighbouring countries. 
 
 
Ghana 
(year 2006) 
Benin 
(year 2004) Burkina Faso 
Total number of samples (number of farms 
surveyed) 8 78 26 
Number of residents surveyed 94 850 303
Number of residents/farm 12 11 12
Total cultivated area (ha) 39 442 173
Cotton area (ha) 10,5 198 52
Total area/resident (ares) 41 52 57
Proportion of cotton (%) 27 45 30
Cotton area/resident (ares) 11 23 17
Mean cotton yield (kg/ha) 1112 1383
Mean food crop yield (kg/ha) 792 1209
Net income*/resident (1000X cedis**) 245 403
* exclu
 bas
 
.7 G
urrently in a fit state to operate:  
 machinery from the United States (we did not visit the TUMU factory 
- PLANTATIONS DEVELOPMENT Ltd (PDL), which runs a factory in WA for which 
ding self-consumption 
e 1000 FCFA = 17900 cedis **
 
3 inning, production and marketing of lint, quality issues 
 
.7.13
 
 Overview 
In GHANA there are 4 Cotton Companies which have 6 ginning factories in the north of 
the country and which are c
 
- GHANA COTTON COMPANY Ltd (GCCL), which runs three factories in 
TAMALE, TUMU and BOLGATANGA; these 3 factories are equipped with 
LUMMUS
which is situated in the North West of GHANA close to the border with BURKINA 
FASO), 
- NULUX PLANTATIONS Ltd, which runs a factory in TAMALE, equipped with 
facilities from the  Popular Republic of China, 
the equipment also comes from China, 
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- INTERCONTINENTAL FARMS Ltd (INCOF) which operates a factory in 
TAMALE, also equipped with machinery from China; during our visit, this factory 
was in the process of being dismantled and transferred to the centre of TAMALE 
to an industrial zone within the same town.   
As the purpose of our examination is not to carry out a detailed t
 
echnical analysis6, we 
will examine hereafter, very briefly, the tools of the trade owned by these four 
 
 
m the National Network, and all the 
factories, except for TUMU, are situated close to asphalt roads and easy to access.    
3.7.2 
 
 
MPERIAL III saw gins 
with 170 saws and Model 700 feeder as well as  a LIFT-BOX DOR-LES down 
 
L II 
introduced at TAMALE in 2003. As for the TUMU 
s an up-packing 20x41 universal density press, with a capacity of 
 per hour, currently reduced to around 10 bales/hour for 
 
 production; the TAMALE and WA 
nly has one 
unit with two 91-saw gins and operates one press for 80 kg bales with a capacity 
of ughly nt produced being essentially destined for the local 
t.  
                          
Companies. This review essentially covers machinery, ginning capacity and technical 
results in order to assess their potential in terms of fibre production.   
It should also be noted that a satisfactory status report was drawn up concerning 
access to and the state of the buildings for the four factories visited: 2 in TAMALE 
(GCCL and NULUX), 1 in BOLGATANGA (GCCL) and 1 in WA (PDL). 
Power supply for the six factories comes fro
 
Ginning equipment & machinery 
We can classify the ginning factory machinery into two groups, on the basis of the 
equipment manufacturer:  
- The GCCL machinery, based on LUMMUS (USA) equipment, modernised or 
recent, and which gin 75 to 80 % of national production; this machinery is 
present: 
 
• in the BOLGATANGA factory, equipped in 1998, which is the best equipped of 
all the country’s factories and at the same level as the factories operating in 
neighbouring countries; in particular it has two modern I
packing press; 20x54 universal density and which can operate at the rate 25 
220 kg bales per hour at universal density. We noted that the bales produced 
could exceed this figure (240/245 kg). Before pressing, there is a moisture 
conditioning (MC) condenser that can raise, if necessary, the lint humidity, 
which must nonetheless remain within accepted levels, 
• at the TAMALE and TUMU factories, equipped in 1979 with 2 IMPERIA
saw gins with 128 saws each, transformed to 158 saws in 2001; the 
equipment is less sophisticated than at BOLGATANGA. A new 20x54 down 
packing press, with a capacity of 25 bales of 220 kg per hour, again at 
universal density, was 
factory, it ha
20/25 bales
maintenance reasons, 
- The machinery at NULUX (TAMALE), PDL (WA) and INCOF (TAMALE), based 
on machinery imported from China, is much less sophisticated than the GCCL 
machinery and gins 20 to 25 % of national
factories (equipped in 1993 and modernised in 1997) are equipped with 2 groups 
of 2 gins with 91 saws and with presses for 220 kg bales which apparently has a 
capacity of 10 bales/hour. The INCOF factory (equipped in 2000) o
ro  13 bales/hour, the li
marke
                      
6 th strial machinery was not included in the terms of reference for the assess  The study of e indu ment  
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M eoreov r, all the factories have lint cleaning systems (air-type, saw-type and brush 
lint cleaners), the essence of which lies in a compromise between improving the 
 
ds in terms of 
maintenance that will increase as the equipment begins to age (spare parts, 
at the BOLGATANGA factory, the largest in the 
country, which has experienced maintenance problems since 2003, although this 
 
inting as the chemical delinting unit was 
shut down several years ago).  
 
.7.3 Ginning capacity 
We will define the potential daily capacity of the factories under normal operating 
 the production line are operating normally with a regular and 
niform seed cotton feed, without bottlenecking.  
work of the 
ginning units which constitute the heart of the system, is as follows: 
  Cd = N S H/1000 F 
 
 
 
  S, the average ginning speed in kg of lint, per saw and per hour, 
 
  
 
Where  H = 19 hours, that is to say an efficiency of 79 % (a capacity three shifts, 5 
ho ppages, 
maintenance and cleaning) and F = 0.40 (40 %), the formula becomes: 
 
    S 
 
As for ginning speeds (S), in general these are speeds recommended by the 
manufacturer  safeguard the quality of the fibre and which should be 
respected. These are real, obtainable speeds which take into account the design of 
the  w ir feeders, ma ce, adjus ts, their env ent (no 
bottlenecking d the variety and quality of the cotton seed (humidity and 
impurities).  
 
We have selected the following figures: 
 
 
is to say: 
 
 
 /h ( < to the "actual" 158 saws) 
grade and respecting the fibres in terms of length and tenacity. 
The machinery used is therefore relatively recent but there are still nee
personnel, etc.).  This is reflected 
year, a team from LUMMUS has taken charge of the revision of the three GCCL 
factories.   
In the same way, NULUX, during the campaign, called in 2 Chinese technicians.   
Lastly, it should be noted that the NULUX factory in TAMALE has a delinting unit; the 
same applies for  PDL in WA (mechanical del
3
 
conditions or possible normal daily capacity (Cd); normal operating conditions mean 
that all the machines in
u
 
The formula giving daily capacity, established on the basis of the 
 
 
Where:    Cd represents the desired capacity, in tonnes of seed cotton/day,   
  N, the total number of gin saws,  
 
  H, the actual number of factory operating hours per day  
  F, the lint yield per unit. 
urs per day stoppage on average for breakdown, closedown, various sto
Cd = 0.0475 N
s in order to
 gins as ell as the intenan tmen ironm
), an
 
- for the three factories with LUMMUS machinery: 
We will apply the average figures for the identical Lummus gins operating in the Sub 
Region, that 
 - Bolgatanga  : 14 kg/saw/h 
 - Tamale and Tumu : 10 kg/saw
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rtain comparable LUMMUS or CONTINENTAL 
machines used in the Sub Region, but of a much earlier design. 
 
 
Normal average potential of the factories (in tonnes of seed cotton/day) 
Companies Factories Number of saws 
Ginning speed 
(kg/saw/h) Daily capacity 
- for the three factories with equipment from China  
As we were not provided with any actual figures, we have opted for 6.5 kg/saw/hour 
(between 6 and 7), on the basis of ce
The following table recapitulates the normal, average, possible daily capacities for 
each factory.   
 
GCCL 
BOLGATANGA 
TAMALE 
TUMU 
Total GCCL 
2 x 170 
2 x 158 
2 x 158 
 
14 
10 
10 
 
226 
150 
150 
526 
NULUX TAMALE 4 x 91 6.5 112 
PDL WA 4 x 91 6.5 112 
INCOF TAMALE 2 x 91 6.5   56 
TOTAL    806 
 
NB 1: the NULUX and PDL factories have presses with a capacity of 10 bales/h, i.e. a 
production of 0.220x10x19 = 41.8 tonnes of lint/day, to be compared with the 
te a 
bottleneck,  
 
NB 2
production from gins which is 44.8 tonnes of lint/day; the presses here constitu
: the capacity of the TUMU factory is 0/110 tonnes of 
seed c e
 
NB 3
temporarily limited to 10
otton/day because of th  press, 
: wi  facto  GCC  a gin apaci 26 to f see
arly 2/3 (65% the tota pacity ble i
NA a  production zone in TAMALE (3 factories), a ginning capacity 
80 to seed c er da
 
th its 3 ries, the L has ning c ty of 5 nnes o d 
cotton per day, that is to say ne
GHA
of 2
NB 4
) of l ca  availa n 
nd the cotton
nnes of otton p y, 
: ov working  as is ase in bourin tries, g four 
shifts and s/7 wi fficie 79 % paci  GH ctorie
can be estimated at 12 tonne ed co r yea  min 0,00
tonnes if we make a ssion  level ciency rate (maintenanc
problems) and/or number of working days.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
er 150  days  the c  neigh g coun  workin
 7 day th an e
0,000 
ncy of 
s of se
, the ca
tton pe
ty of the
r, at the
ANA fa
imum 10
s 
0 
conce at the  of the effi e 
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3.7.4 Technical results 
 
 ginning results during the last 6 years: 
  
The following table represents the trend in
 
Trend in ginning results  
Companies 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 
GCCL 18 869 8 410 8 784 7 295 12 738 20 627
PDL 2 394 2 109 1 189 719 1 934 1 992
NULUX 4 218 1 348 1 848 1 592 1 981 2 209
Other 5 535 2 112 1 806 1 228 1 659 851
Produ
of se
cotton 
(tons) 
79
ction 
ed 
Total 31 016 13 979 13 627 10 834 18 312 25 9
GCCL 7 176 3 305 3 432 2 962 5 102 8 202
PDL 1 005 1 223 408 287 774 772
NULUX 1 627 497 742 618 811 911
Other 2 214 845 722 491 664 340
Production 
of cotton lint 
(ton
25
s) 
Total 12 022 5 870 5 304 4 358 7 351 10 2
GCCL 38.03% 39.30% 39.07% 40.60% 40.05% 39.76%
PDL 41.98% 57.99% 34.31% 39.92% 40.02% 38.76%
NULUX 38.57% 36.87% 40.15% 38.82% 40.94% 41.24%
Other 40.00% 40.01% 39.98% 39.98% 40.02% 39.95%
Gross lint 
yie
6%
ld  
Averages 38.76% 41.99% 38.92% 40.23% 40.14% 39.3
 
 
1 – as regards the capacities established above, the GHANA factories are very clearly 
d breakdowns,  
2 – the GCCL alone handles 75 to 80 % of the country’s fibre production, the other 
uction being low and more in the field of craftmanship than 
industrial production,   
 
 
3.7.5 
 
vesting, duration 
etween harvesting time and picking time, quality of spraying, quality of picking, 
quality, and in order to 
improve the situation, Cotton companies and farmers have agreed on the principle of 
We have the following remarks to make concerning this table, as the PDL figures for 
the 2001/2002 campaign were incorrect:  
oversized for current cotton seed production, with running speeds that are 
probably very chaotic, depending on cotton seed supply an
Companies’ prod
3 – average fibre yields are about 40 %, which is around 2% down on rates achieved 
in the neighbouring countries but similar to that of CHAD.   
We do not have precise numbers for quantities of seeds produced, the proportion of 
which amounts, on the basis of the whole cotton flower, to 52 % for NULUX (high 
proportion of waste), to 53/ 54 % for the GCCL factories and 56 % for PDL (average 
waste). 
Seed cotton quality 
The quality of seed-cotton depends on several factors: date of har
b
grading at farm level etc.  
The way some farmers harvest their cotton leads to poor 
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two grades for seed-cotton and two consequently two prices, price for grade B being 
20% lower than price for grade A. 
ying samples of seed-
cotton with grade A and B. Unfortunately, the device used by GCCL cannot be used 
of seed-cotton higher than 98%, far above 
the real situation. At the same time, a better-designed sample box enables Nulux to 
ms. Annex 5 shows the two seed-grading boxes. 
 
 
 
 seed, also depends on the fertilising and health related measures 
sation of the harvest, the storage and transport conditions for the 
 
equipment to measure the main characteristics of 
 
 by 
 in Annex 6 and can be 
of the analysis says for the two 
7
 
3.7.7 
 
 
                                                
 
Cotton companies have prepared samples (“boxes”) displa
efficiently, leading to a grade A proportion 
do a proper grading with about 30% of grade B seed-cotton.   
Since GCCL produces about 80% of the cotton of Ghana, it means that most of the 
seed-cotton of Ghana is purchased without grading, which explain some of the lint 
quality proble
To agree on a standardised grading system, using the same samples and principles 
is an absolute necessity to improve the quality of seed-cotton.  
3.7.6 The quality of the lint 
 
As mentioned above, the quality of the lint, which is essentially a question of the
variety of cotton
taken, the optimi
cotton seed and of course, the ginning conditions. Of course, it is also important that 
the packaging, the handling and storage of the bales is carried out with due care and 
in this respect it should be noted that the three GCCL factories are equipped with bale 
handling and bagging systems with pushers, the polypropylene bags being supplied 
by FILTISAC (RCI). The bale handling systems are traditional systems, the “clamp” 
type mechanisms being preferable.  
 
All companies have their own way for classing the lint they produce: 
 
- GCCL has set-up a classing facility in Bolgatanga; the classing system is based 
on 9 categories, the three first ones being the “grade A”. 
- Nulux has invested in classing 
each bale. 
- PDL is sending its samples to Burkina Faso (SOFITEX). 
 
- INCOF: no classing (only local sales). 
 
Several samples of lint taken at the GCCL Bolgatanga facilities have been tested
the CIRAD laboratory in Montpellier; the results are detailed
considered as quite satisfactory, as the conclusion 
samples“ :  
 
- “ These cottons are long around 1"1/8 and a little more but under 1"5/32 with a 
good uniformity and small quantity of short lint. The strength is good as well as 
the elongation ”.   
- “ The colour shows a good reflectance and close to white classified in Middling 
white in the USDA table; one can look at some visible small trash inside the lint ” 
Marketing of lint 
For many years, the cotton produced in Ghana has been sold to the local industry; 
most of the industry has however disappeared during the last years, mainly because
7 This is only the result of the analysis of the samples and should of course not be extrapolated at all 
the Ghanaian cotton production! 
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of the competition of cheaper products from the Far East, especially China. From 
local consumption is now about 
4 000 T, with only one company, Akosombo Textiles Ltd buying local lint.  
 
 
s that Ghana lint is usually discounted by 5 to 
10% to the Cotlook Index prices. This is due to several aspects: 
- Lint quality could be improved, 
 
- Ghana cotton is not known on the market because of the too small quantities 
traded, 
 
- Ghana production is inconsistent, varying a lot from year to year; it is therefore 
very difficult for a trader to create loyalty among users of cotton from Ghana,  
 
- The various quality problems mentioned above. 
 
3.7.8 Conclusion 
 
The 4 Cotton Companies operating in GHANA have relatively recent factories 
equipped either with modern, high quality LUMMUS machinery, in particular in 
BOLGATANGA, which can be highly productive, or with facilities imported from 
China; these factories are currently clearly underused.   
The conclusion of the assessment of ginneries is that there is no need for heavy 
investment in the next few years, but also that the maintenance has to be improved 
and better organised, especially with GCCL, who should  go on with its programme of 
revamping its ginneries.  
The only investments that should be done are linked to the handling of the lint bales, 
the present situation being not satisfactory and leading to possible quality problems.  
 
3.8 The financial situation of the cotton companies 
 
T
P
c
 
3.8.1 P
 
T
about 20 000 T of lint sold locally in the early 90s, the 
Most of the lint is therefore sold on the world market, through traders and brokers, 
who usually trade lint from neighbouring countries. 
Because of quality problems, it seem
 
he detailed financial situation for the three main cotton companies (GCCL, NULUX, 
DL) is shown in a confidential annexed report ; below is the global situation of the 
ompanies, some data being used to describe the evolution since 1997. 
rofitability of the cotton companies 
he graphs below shows the evolution of the profitability of the three companies: 
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Profit & loss accounts (total three companies)
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After a sharp decline from the late nineties up to the year 2003, the sales have 
recovered since year 2004, linked to GCCL improved situation. The operating and 
 a 
h total sales 
amounting 72.3 Million USD, i.e. about 71%! The financial situation of the three 
companies can therefore be considered as rather disastrous, and definitely not 
sustainable. 
The evolution of profitability ratio shown in the graph below confirm those 
observations  
net profits remain however negative, and the three companies have accumulated
total net loss of 53.6 Million USD since 1998, to be compared wit
 
Three companies : Sales & Profit Ratios
-250% 
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-100% 
-50% 
0% 
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Ratio net profit / Sales
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3.8.2 Assets and liabilities 
 
The consequence of such losses is the worsening of the debt situation, with a ratio 
“loans / total liabilities” higher than 100% as shown in the graph below :  
Three companies : Ratio Loans / Total balance
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50%
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
When compared to the sales, the amount of the loans owed by the companies is very 
high, as shown in graph below ; the improvement of the situation since 2004 is rather 
artificial, being linked to the swap “debt-equity” undertaken by GCCL. 
Evolution of the Ratio "Loans / Sales"
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3.8.3 Conclusion 
 
The financial situation of the three coton companies is very bad and none of them can 
expand its activities unless a radical change occures in order for them to improve 
their profitability. 
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The potential for cotton production in Ghana depends on the following factors: 
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Average area grown in cotton per farm: 
 
more cotton in the zones with more animal traction 
p o r r 
o
Seed-cotton yields:
At the moment, the average area grown in cotton per farm is below 1 hectare (0.55 
Ha during the last five years), but this figure could increase significantly providing 
solutions are brought to land preparation issues.  
 
The following figures have been used in the calculation, based on the hypothesis that 
farmers8 will be able to grow 
(mainly Upper East): 
- In Northern region:   1 Ha of cotton per farmer 
- In Up er West regi n:  1.5 Ha of cotton pe  farme
- In Upper East region:  2 Ha of cott n per farmer 
 
 
 
 
Three hypothesis have been considered for the average seed-cotton yields: 1 T / Ha, 
1.25 T / Ha and 1.5 T / Ha. 
Estimation of seed-cotton production: 
The table below summarizes the above mentioned data and shows the estimation of 
cotton production estimation: 
  Northern Region 
Upper East 
Region 
Upper 
West 
Region 
TOTAL 
 
 
  
DEM ar 2000 census)         OGRAPHIC DATA (Ye
  Total population 1 820 806 920 089 576 583 3 317 478
  pulation density (/ km2) 25.9 104.1Po 31.2 33.9
  Total active population 897 509 429 602 299 434 1 626 545
  % Total active / Total population 49.3 46.7 51.9 49.0
  Agriculture active population 644 507 294 961 225 688 1 165 156
  % Agric active / Total active 71.8 68.7 75.4 71.6
  Estimated number of farms * 107 418 49 160 37 615 194 193
POTENTIAL FOR COTTON PRODUCTION        
  Average number of cotton growers last 5 years 33 000
  Potential cotton production       
   % cotton growers / total farmers 50% 70% 60%   
   Number of cotton growers 53 709 34 412 22 569 110 690
   Area in cotton per farm (Ha) 1.0 2.0 1.5   
   709 68 824 33 853 156 386Total area in cotton (Ha) 53 
   Potential seed-cotton production (T)       
 Average Yield = 1 000 kg / ha 53 709 68 824 33 853 156 386   
 Average Yield = 1 250 kg / ha 67 136 86 030 42 317 195 483   
  Average Yield = 1 500 kg / ha 80 563 103 236 50 780 234 580    
 * One farm = 6 active     
                                                
thern Mali, where almost all cotton growers have bullocks, the average area in cotton is highe8 In Sou r 
than 3 hectares per farmer. 
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 If one consider an average yield of 1.25 T / Ha for seed-cotton, more realistic than 1.5 
 favourable hypothesis and the 
T / Ha, the potential production, according to the hypothesis, can therefore be 
estimated at about 200 000 Tons of seed-cotton, with the 2000 population figures. 
Those estimations are rather conservative; more
natural growth of the population would lead to a potential production of 300 000 T 
within the next 10 or 15 years. 
Below is a possible evolution of seed-cotton production, based on a annual 30% 
increase of production, leading to a production of more than 200 000 T after 10 years:  
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
T of seed-cotton 20 000 26 000 33 800 43 940 57 122 74 259 96 536 125 497 163 146 212 090
 
Potential cotton development in other regions: from an agronomic point of view, it is
po sible to grow cotton in other regions, like Bronghafo or Volta, providing there is a 
 
s
 
 
regi ts of transport for 
 
4.2 
 
 
4.2.1 
 
of “cotton companies”: the 
ones who own a ginnery and the ones who do not, and have to gin the seed-cotton 
 
Considering (i) that the risk of seed-cotton diversion and poaching increases 
proportionally to the number of companies, (ii) that a company without ginnery cannot 
do anything more and/or better than a company with a ginnery, (iii) the limited size of 
the Ghana cotton sector and that four companies have ginneries, (iv) the fact that any 
company with a ginnery has shown through its industrial investment a genuine 
interest in the cotton sector, it seems obvious that only companies who own ginneries 
should be considered as cotton companies and be entitled to promote the cotton 
production with farmers. This would lead to four companies allowed to work in the 
cotton sector: GCCL, Nulux Plantations, Plantations Development Ltd and Incof Ltd. 
sufficient period of time at the end of the cotton cycle without any rain, in order to
allow the harvesting of seed-cotton in good conditions. One advantage of those
ons would be a shorter distance from the coast, i.e. lower cos
inputs, lint and seed. However, the main constraint to cotton production in those 
regions will be, as mentioned in the South of the Northern region, the competition 
from other crops, more profitable and/or easier to grow. Therefore, one should be 
careful in trying to promote cotton production in the South of Ghana, and preliminary 
studies and surveys should be undertaken before initiating any large scale project. It 
should also be noted that there are no ginneries in those regions, which would 
therefore require a heavy investment at the beginning of any project promoting the 
cotton production.   
Conditions for the development of the cotton sector  
Among the numerous problems faced by the cotton sector stake holders, two of them 
are crucial: (i) the question of a definition of a cotton company and the zoning 
situation and (ii) the financial issues. 
The zoning and the cotton companies 
At the moment in Ghana, one can distinguish two kinds 
they purchase from farmers at the existing ginneries. Since the principle of zoning is 
now accepted, the question is to decide who should be considered as cotton 
companies. There are two main answers to this question: (i) one is that any company 
willing to promote the cotton production with farmers should be allowed to be a 
“cotton company” and (ii) the other answer is that only companies with ginneries 
should be considered as “cotton companies”. 
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4.2.2 Financial issues 
 
Finance is the cornerstone of the cotton industry, as farmers need to be pre-financed 
for the input supply and the purchase of their crop:  
ed-cotton to be 
paid to farmers at harvesting time and (ii) the income generated from the sale of the 
(between 3 months and 1 year after harvesting of seed-cotton), 
the needs in working capital are high and a cotton company can expand its business 
 
Two m
compa
If farmers do not repay the loans received for the inputs: too low yields, diversion 
of 
- If t
of seed-cotton, that represents more than 2/3 of its total cost.  
 
ing
cotton 
th farmers (input supply etc.). Unfortunately, it happened that 
the 
lution has been found so far with 
s they could without the 
 
e short term, ADB should 
 
Because of the long delay between (i) the expenses required to organise of the cotton 
production: inputs, to be purchased at the beginning of a year and se
lint and cotton-seed 
only it has the sufficient financial resources, at a reasonable cost. 
ain risks can cause a degradation of the financial situation of a cotton 
ny:  
- 
seed-cotton etc. 
he price of lint is too low to cover all the costs of production, including the cost 
Dur  many years, the total liberalisation of the sector lead to the creation of several 
companies, attracted by the possibility of getting loans from ADB to promote 
cotton production wi
some of those companies where not genuinely interested in the cotton sector and 
used the loans they benefited from ADB for other purposes. At the same time, 
diversions and “poaching” of seed-cotton became widely spread and that lead to 
heavy indebtedness for the cotton companies who had been involved in the input 
upply on credit. The high interest rates prevailing in Ghana have only worsened s
situation and the financial situation of all companies became therefore critical. 
Actually, all of them would go bankrupt if ADB wanted the debts to be repaid. The 
solution has been found in the case of GCCL through a swap “debt-equity”, leading to 
e control of 78% of GCCL capital by ADB. No soth
the other companies and unless this issue is solved, their survival is not guaranteed. 
This debt issue puts the companies in a very difficult situation, because they cannot 
borrow any money from banks to pre-finance the input supply for the farmers and to 
buy the seed-cotton. They have therefore to use their own limited resources to run 
eir business, not enabling to expand the cotton production ath
financial constraints. The financial issue is therefore the major bottleneck for the 
cotton industry in Ghana, and should be solved urgently.  
Because the three « smaller companies » are highly indebted with ADB, they could 
be bankrupt if the Bank wanted its debts to be repaid immediately. This means that 
ADB, through its ownership of GCCL and its position of creditor with the other cotton 
companies is actually the major or even the only actor, i.e. has the monopoly of the 
otton sector, which is not a satisfactory situation. In thc
therefore solve the issue of the debt with the three companies Nulux, PDL and Incof, 
and should make a clear commitment to sell its majority share of GGCL. 
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 5. POSSIBLE AFD INVOLVEMENT IN THE GHANAIAN COTTON 
SECTOR 
There are justifications for an AFD support to t
 
 
he cotton industry in Ghana; however, 
ome important issues should be addressed before any involvement.  
 
5.1 
in Ghana, similar to neighbouring 
countries. The cotton production can increase significantly with a better 
 
is far beyond the actual production, and no 
heavy investments are needed to increase the production up to 100 000 T of 
s and cotton farmers association) and of an 
5. Yields and repayment rates of input loans are improving and a growing 
of farmers is now convinced that only well looked after and 
intensive cotton growing can be profitable.  
7. The financial situation of GCCL has been improved and the company has now 
wth. 
 
ctor; those companies have already invested a lot of 
financial resources in the industry and are really committed to expand their 
 
ed at supporting the Ghanaian cotton sector: 
s
Justifications 
 
1. There is a big potential for cotton production 
organisation of the sector, if clear rules are established for all stakeholders 
and if financial resources are made available for cotton companies. 
 
2. The three “Northern regions” of Ghana are the poorest in the country and 
farmers have the lowest income; cotton can play a major role in improving the 
livelihood of hundreds of thousands of people. 
3. The existing ginning capacity 
seed-cotton. 
 
4. The cotton sector is now better organised, with the emergence of professional 
organisations (cotton companie
inter-professional body (standing committee). All stakeholders now agree on 
the necessity of zoning and the necessity of confidence among all of them. 
 
proportion 
 
6. With a better organisation and higher quantities produced, the cotton 
produced in Ghana could be more profitable than cotton from Burkina Faso 
and Mali, thanks to (i) lower costs of transport (shorter distance from sea) and 
(ii) a currency non overvalued compared to the US$.  
 
a new management and the necessary resources to finance its gro
8. There is a genuine commitment of private companies in the development of 
the Ghana cotton se
activities if their financial situation improves (debt). 
 
9. Both national and international investors have shown some interest in GCCL 
when ADB sells its majority share in the company.  
 
5.2 Possible fields of intervention for AFD 
Below is a tentative list of what could be the various fields of intervention in which 
could be involved an AFD financed aim
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5.2.1 Capacity building & training:  
 
The need of training and capacity building is obvious, at all levels of the sector, and a 
f training programmes aimed at improving the capacity of various 
 of the cotton companies, (ii) farmer’s 
standing committee for instance. 
 
 
 research end extension is very poor at 
. 
 
5.2.4 
 
 
5.3 
 
, as it is not the role of GCCL to remain durably the 
agement should be 
organise the setup o
stakeholders of the cotton sector: (i) employees
groups and associations, (iii) professional and inter-professional organisations, (iv) 
staff of the three Northern Ghana RADUs etc.  
 
One important goal of a cotton project would be the support to the setup of an inter-
professional organisation, based on the existing 
5.2.2 Improvement in the seed-cotton price methodology 
Smooth relations between the main stakeholders of the cotton sector, cotton growers 
and cotton companies, is a crucial condition for its stability and development. The 
main subject of conflict between them is the price of seed cotton as it has been seen 
in 2006; therefore, it is very important that both parties agree on an objective fair price 
fixation system, and AFD could support Ghana cotton sector in setting up such 
system, based on the experience gained from neighbouring countries. 
  
5.2.3 Research and extension, lint classing, 
 
As mentioned in chapter 3.6, the situation of
the moment and a project could design applied research programme, aimed at 
improving some of essential basis of the cotton sector, as the cotton varieties and 
seed production scheme for instance
Seed cotton quality and lint classing are also important issues that a project could 
deal with, by supporting uniform systems to be used by all cotton companies and 
cotton producers. 
Financial issues 
The debts from farmers towards the cotton companies have disastrous impact on the 
financial situation of the all sector and can put cotton companies in a position of 
bankrupt. A cotton project could assist producers and cotton companies in supporting 
the involvement of rural banks in credit schemes aimed at supplying farmers with 
inputs paid on credit. Three parties contracts could be setup, involving (i) the cotton 
growers, (ii) the cotton companies and (iii) the rural banks. 
Pre-requisites before an AFD involvement in the cotton sector 
The present situation is not suitable for an AFD involvement, several points should be 
considered as pre-requisite: 
 
- Enforce zoning and limit the number of cotton companies to the four companies 
who own a ginnery. 
- Sustainable and long-term solution should be found to solve the debt issues of 
the private Cotton Companies, in order for ADB to finance the cotton sector. 
- The question of ADB role in the cotton sector, and in particular its ownership of 
GCCL should be clarified
majority shareholder of the company. A plan for diseng
established, with clear deadlines. 
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6. PERSPECTIVES AND RECOMMANDATIONS 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Apart from the pre-requisites mentioned about a possible AFD involvement in the 
cotton sector, recommendations summarising the comments made in the chapters 
above have been issued. Some of them could be implemented shortly, while some 
others  are from a longer-term point of view: 
 
 
ct” between Cotton Companies, 
Farmers, ADB and MOFA: a formalisation of the relations between farmers, 
cotton companies, with a strong involvement of MOFA would create a better 
institutional environment for the cotton sector. This kind of “contract” has been 
setup in most of the neighbouring countries, it describes the role, rights and 
obligations of all parties. 
 
- To organise an efficient and fair input supply system, based on a tender to be 
organised for the entire cotton sector. 
 
- To prepare and implement a cotton seed multiplication programme, in 
collaboration with SARI. 
 
- Cotton companies should study with ADB (or any other bank ready to finance the 
cotton sector) to “dollarise” the financial issues, as they now sell all their 
production abroad, paid in USD. The interest rates in Cedis are at the moment 
still very high, more than 20% per annum, while the average depreciation rate 
Cedis vs. USD has been during the last years below 5% a year; therefore, as is 
seems possible for the cotton companies to borrow USD at a rate lower than 
12% par annum, it becomes financially more sound to borrow in USD instead of 
borrowing in Cedis (providing it is legal for a company to do it). 
 
- To improve and strengthen the relations between RADUs and the cotton 
companies, in order for MOFA staff to support them on technical issues 
(extension, training of CPAs and cotton growers), group formation etc. MOFA - 
RADUs and the standing committee should also be in charge of collecting the 
data on the cotton sector from the cotton companies.  
 
- Experiment no-tillage cotton sowing, using experience from Cameroon, Burkina 
Faso and Mali, in order to try to solve the question of land preparation. 
 
- Use proper compound fertilizer (NPKSMgB) and urea for cotton instead of 3 x 15 
and ammonium sulphate. 
 
- Improve the seed-cotton price fixation system, using a two-stage system, based 
on the world cotton price; it would be interesting to learn from the experience of 
neighbouring countries.  
 
- Set up a standardised seed-cotton and lint classing system. 
 
- Improve the farmer’s group organisation, and initiate the creation of Apex entities, 
based on administrative and cotton companies zones subdivisions. 
 
- Improve the links between the research, the cotton companies and the farmers. 
- To agree and implement a common (used by all seed companies) and effective 
seed-cotton grading system. 
- To prepare a “Cotton Development Contra
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- Improve the technical training and extension of CPAs.  
 
MOFA role in the cotton sector 
 
The implementation of most of the recommendations needs a stronger involvement of 
MOFA in the cotton-sector; MOFA should clearly define the “rules of the game” and 
make sure that all stakeholders fulfil their obligations. This is particularly important in 
the case of zoning and cotton companies, as well as for the debt issue, which may 
require an external arbitrage to be settled. 
More involvement of MOFA does not mean it should interfere in the day-to-day 
relations between farmers and cotton companies, but MOFA should regulate the 
cotton sector in order to assist the stakeholders when needed and enforce the rules 
and regulations when it appears to be necessary.  
